I'd guess that to get enough access to repair the vehicle you might have to be able to send certain commands to turn off alerts or update part information. Now that would probably only be a problem if the current set up for most car manufactures is a binary is dealer then be able to do anything setup.

But wouldn't that be trivially solved by only allowing such inputs via a physical interface (like say the physical OBD-II port) instead of Bluetooth or whatever they are using? Or if a physical socket is undesirable, at least a physical switch you have to use to allow such access?

Yes. That's why everyone is calling it regulatory capture.

Right now they have a system where automakers granted themselves a dangerous and unreasonable level of remote access to cars that aren't theirs. Now they're claiming that it would be dangerous and unreasonable for third parties to have that level of remote access to cars that aren't theirs.

No kidding.

But you could easily have a system where a remote access server has to be authorized by the owner, e.g. by having to press a button inside the car while the key is present. And could be revoked by the owner in the same way. Then the car could be repaired by anyone... who is inside the car and has the key. Which is not only completely reasonable, it's more reasonable than the thing they're doing now.

The buttons and keyswitch may be connected to the same CAN network which is the source of the vulnerability.

Modern cars have electronic keys that can use cryptography. You can't forge a digital signature by hotwiring the car.

Isn't that pretty much what immobilizer bypass modules have done for years?

Those are for cars with physical keys. In cars where the key switch is only telling the computer "is key present: [y/n]" they put a message on the bus that answers yes and the car starts. But if you're going to use the need for security as a defense then you don't start by designing your car like that.

Some car manufacturers have also attempted to use encryption and implemented it so poorly that it was easily cracked.

There is no technical reason that a car key can't effectively be a yubikey. The computer issues a challenge to the key, answering the challenge requires a secret stored in the key, so you need the key. It works as long as the encryption isn't broken.

And if "car can be remotely controlled" and the encryption is broken then that's a much bigger problem than anything your local mechanic is doing.

> The computer issues a challenge to the key, answering the challenge requires a secret stored in the key, so you need the key.

This is how most modern “smart key” systems work.

There are devices that plug into the obd2 and then allow remote access. I’ve heard of them being used by stalkers.

Solvable? Yes.

Trivially? No.

It's not trivial to (re)design the bus system to allow open access while also implementing proper security to prevent malicious access. The only people calling this regulatory capture are the ones that don't know anything about the difficulties of programming to hardware, especially when you can't just patch out the bugs with a trivial OTA update.

In my view, all they really need is to allow read-only data display through the OBD2, or via an authenticated web portal assuming the manufacturer has the data already. If you remove the wireless part of it (which the law doesn't say you mush access it wirelessly), then the remote operation is a non-issue.

Really seems like a lot of fuss about stuff that has plenty of possible options. I might even call it FUD or a miscommunication it's so sloppy.

Personally, I don't want a car sending data to anyone. I disconnected OnStar in the one vehicle that had it. Pretty simple to remove the bridge between the cell board and the rest of the electronics.