But if they rank everything "7+" then they have plausible deniability.
So everything will be ranked 7-10. Meaning 1-6 are useless.
"
Uh, none of this explains why they re-score the vulnerabilities themselves, ignoring the vendor scores and deciding they know best, when they seem to know ... nothing.
Which if you read through the links, you'll see is one of the main complaints, and something they document here:
https://nvd.nist.gov/general/FAQ-Sections/CVE-FAQs#faqLink9
Their take is basically "we get to do this and if it's wrong it's your problem to get us to correct us".
That doesn't make any sense.
As my child's kindergarten teacher once asked a student: "Do you think if everyone decided to do that, it would turn out okay?"
NVD and CVE teams will simply never have the expertise or time or information necessary to actually re-score these things correctly. You'll also note that despite claiming they score things based on publicly available information, and that othres must do the same, they cite absolutely no sources to Daniel to defend their scoring.
They light themselves on fire, generate smoke and noise that others have to deal with, and then complain that it's the job of others to put it out.
That's a different problem to deal with a different way.
People keep lying to me, so i'm going to ignore what they tell me and make it up myself doesn't seem like it's going to generate great results.
Put another way - "NVD making stuff up that is not accurate" is not a solution for "other people making stuff up that is not accurate".
If you want responsibility, you have to incentivize it somehow, whether carrot or stick. This doesn't achieve that. They can tell their customers whatever they want, and then blame any difference on NVD being mean.
> So?
So he comprehensively refuted your point by explaining why
Sure the vendors have motive to underestimate, but they're also far better equipped to accurately assess severity. Better to focus on them and hold them accountable.
If NVD completely re-scored submitted CVEs from scratch, then they'd replace a biased dataset with a noisier but unbiased dataset.
On the other hand, if NVD accepts high severities and only re-scores low severity CVEs, then the collected database might exchange a low-severity bias for a high-severity bias.
Indeed. It occurs to me that there's a possible feedback loop here. To the exent that NVD increases the severity of all (or even some) CVEs, they are effectively increasing the incentive for vendors to report lower severities, since the vendors may rightly assume that NVD will inflate the severity anyway.
Instead, many people seem to believe they can blindly trust NVD, when their severity assessment is arbitrary and based on wild guessing. And individuals at NVD probably have their own biases as well!
I had worked for Red Hat prodsec for 6 years doing the kernel work. It is common that I regularly resubmit rescores requests to CVSSv3 to NVD, they seem to be pretty good about it when it is clearly explained.
NVD will sometimes consider flaws scoring it the 'general' use case not in the specific use case which can make scoring libraries environment and usage specific.
If you're willing to you can find my contact details in my profile. Thanks!
Making your own stuff up is not a solution for other people making stuff up or underselling things.
Obviously this comes down to how often they're wrong and by how much.
The NVD and CVE teams are very low staffed, with people who get a large amount of reports every day. There is no way they can process each report as thoroughly as people want them to while reporting the security issues as fast as possible. I can understand the frustration, but there should be some consideration for these facts.
The social issue continues in that people want some quick and easy to understand number, because they and their company also cannot process in a short time if these security vulns are substantial or not.
Then there's gaming of the system where products with bugs do not want to be exposed as insecure, so they will try to lower the scores assigned to them. Then there's pentesters who want to get high scoring bugs for bounties and clout, and they will try to raise the scores...
All this ends up where the scores mean very little, but it's the best we have. I've seen vulns with a 9+ that are clearly not exploitable, and ones that are 6-7 which are powerful easily exploitable primitives.