And absolutely, however creativity is the tip of the spear which pushes beyond constraints to develop novel AND meaningful style (like Beksinski, Kopera, Kostetsky, Moebius, etc).
Nice try.
Note that the same can be said about the negation: show me a proof that it can't.
I guess my last response was too hard for you to understand since you respond with this. Perhaps you are new to things like "reading between the lines".
You are the one who made this claim:
> That is an incredibly strong assertion that evidence does not seem to support currently.
To avoid loosing more time, I'll write what you failed to understand: "That evidence does not seem to support currently" is your claim, something you can prove, shows the evidence you are talking about.
You still didn't send any link to the evidence you were talking about.
Proving that we can reliably simulate human brains requires showing that nowhere in any human brains does such signals ever emanate. We can get close if we one day have the capacity to run a simulated brain for long enough to show it appears to function like a human, but when the counter hypothesises a violation of known physics that may well be intermittent and extremely limited, we can't realistically absolutely prove its absence.
As such, the former is tractable if such signals can occur, the latter is not, and so I think my comparison of it elsewhere to a claim of Russel's proverbial orbiting teapot is reasonable - people will always be able to claim that there is some so far unobserved difference, and given it postulates highly localised violations of known physics and this seems like an absolutely extraordinary claim, the burden must be theirs.
My point is that to make the claim "human creativity" can be simulated surely would have the burden.
Just one measurement that doesn't fit would be enough to shift the burden. Absent that, any suggestion we can't is no more than a religious belief.
It'd take a truly extraordinary find that'd upend both physics and areas of logic for that assertion to be false.
The definition of creativity itself should include the ability to subvert a system through abstraction. AI is a system so it cannot subvert itself (or, it hasn't yet). As humans, we subvert systems in mathematics by creating higher dimensional abstraction and shattering previous understanding of the fields. Often, mathematicians achieve this with a "lightening bolt-like realization" that they do not attribute to systematic thinking.
Please reconsider whether systematizability should be so quickly assumed through napkin philosophy. If you want, prove with a topological map of the creative apparatus in the brain that it produces results in a systematic way. That would at least scratch the itch and get the conversation going somewhere interesting.
What you call "systematizability" is irrelevant. Only whether or not a function can be computed matter, and if a function can be computed by a brain restricted to known physics, there is no reasonable theory under why it can compute anything which can't be computed by any universal turing machine, given the absence of even any real hypothesis for any category of functions which can't, and it'd be an absolutely extraordinary claim to suggest such a function exist.
Where you'd get a Nobel in physics if you could show unknown physics in the brain, you'd secure a Nobel in mathematics if you could come up with a class of functions the brain can compute which can't be computed by a computer, because it'd fundamentally break basic assumptions in any number of subfields of both maths and computer science.
What you describe as "subverting itself" does not require anything as drastic. It merely requires thought processes unobservable by the person in question, and processes to complex to casually understand and/or randomness. Given a large proportion of people don't even have an inner voice they can "listen to" in order to observe their thought processes other than via outputs, and we know e.g. from split-brain experiments that the conscious part of human reasoning often outright invents knowledge and observation of thought processes, we have no reliable way of analysing the extent to which thinking is "systematic", and plenty of evidence to suggest we can not trust any such notion.