"Making money" is complicated. If you hold rights to shale oil, they may be worth more or less, depending on external conditions. You might sell on those rights, or leverage those rights, and it might go on a long, long time and never be actually invoked to process the shale. It was the act of being ABLE to, which drove the money cycle. It put a bottom over supply chain risk.
No one interested in investing looks at money so simplistically.
A muni bond would have yielded $.50, but you still have the underlying asset, so it isn't a loss, its a guaranteed return of 50% every 10 yrs, until the bond matures (you get your $1 back) or is defaulted on.
The SP500 doesn't guarantee anything, and there are 10 yr periods where it has negative growth.
As for it being a muni bond, the risk is low but still there. Municipalities do in fact default sometimes.
There’s reasons why other investments exist and one is the risk of the investment. Municipal bonds are really stable and some investors just want predictable returns and will sacrifice overall returns for stability and lower risk.
Oil investments aren’t municipal bonds, but I expect most oil investors want stable returns.
So if you buy a $1M bond for $850k, but then interest rates go up and the value of the bond drops to $650k, then you've lost money through opportunity cost, but you'll still get your $1M at maturity.
Not that different with oil fields. If you assume it will produce X barrels, but only produces 20%*X barrels, not only is the money you're making lower, but the value of the oil field also drops (since its value is dependent upon production potential).
But this info isn’t enough to decide anything without the current value of the investment. If the investment is $0 then that’s horrible. If it’s $1 then it’s paid out 50% over ten years so not that great. But if it’s $2, then that’s a good investment.
The fact that this crucial information is missing from the article makes me think the author is an idiot or excluding it because it doesn’t support his position.
You generate assets during that period and the potential to pump oil. Same way that you invest money to a startup with 0 revenues.
If only, say, 3% annual returns above the interest rate were projected on a project, it would be clearly below the line of viability. There would be no reason to bother with the hassle and risk: just park your money in an index fund.
The BP company that owns the exploration rights pays BP to determine the feasibility, then BP pays BP to extract the oil, then BP pays BP to ship the oil, then BP pays BP to refine the oil, then BP pays BP to distribute the refined products, then BP pays BP to fill the tanks at the bowsers, then we pay BP to fill our car, and every one of those BP segments makes a margin.
So yeah, I agree, just because a drilling operation looks like a loss in isolation, unless you view it in context of that entire vertical integration, you're missing the woods for the trees.
In the US, this last step is not BP. The gas station is almost certainly not owned by BP, but rather pays BP royalties as a franchisor, and also does not buy oil from BP directly, I believe a gas station operator buys from separate trucking businesses that contract with refineries (that may or may not be owned or operated by BP) to deliver the oil to the gas station.
That's just vertical integration, a lot of companies do it to varying degrees. For example there is a long history of power plants owning coal mines. Bell, at one point in history owned the mines that produced the resources they used to make their telephones!
VAT is not a sales tax but a tax for the full chain of added value.
BP as a whole should be responsible for the cleanup cost, around wells and of the air.
The point is to ensure that all of the "unprofitable" but necessary precursors to the small fraction of the business that makes all the money, spooling up established and productive wells during favorable market conditions, are coordinated to maximize those conditions in the face of the uncertainty of industrial prospecting, rather than the interests a contractor might have. In such a skewed-return field, other strategies risk over-fitting; it'd be like if you saw the housing collapse coming in 06 or so and responded by trying to target your retirement investments against a granularity level of individual regional banks. Just shorting an index will pay out far more on average, even if it's more "inefficient".
While this is true traditionally, shale is a different ballgame. A lot of the money spent in these shale plays is gone forever.
If you spend $8 million to drill a well and expect to make a 20% ROR at $70 oil, you're going to have a bad time when the price of WTI collapses to $40. And these shale wells have such fast decline rates that 10 years later they'll be making 1/100th of their initial rates. You either make your money fast, or take a big loss on the chin.
The major price decline beginning in 2014 and the huge hit during the pandemic (oil prices went negative, remember!) has made shale a major loser for investors. And plenty of the reserves companies booked had to be written off, either because of overly optimistic price requirements or inflated production estimates. Just look at Apache's Alpine High fiasco.
Oil business is not that easy to analyze. There is no such thing as "recovered about 50 cents for each dollar invested". People think the oil business is all about drilling. In reality it's first about reserves and then about drilling. "Each dollar invested" goes first towards acquiring new reserves and upgrading existing ones (from possible to probable, from probable to proven). A bit of "each dollar invested" goes into the actual drilling. The sale price of the oil certainly exceeds the actual cost of drilling (oil producers are very, very elastic in shutting down drills). But how exactly do you measure the return on investment for the money that does not go into the actual drilling?