Some years go by, and AGI progresses to assault man
Atop a pile of paper clips he screams "It's not my fault, man!"
But Eliezer's long since dead, and cannot hear Sam Altman.
Between point 1 and 2 there must be quite a few other steps, causally linked, otherwise it's just a massive imaginary leap based on assumptions that nobody is explaining.
> The dismissals from Tyler Cohen and Pinker are mostly just relying on heuristics which are often right, but even if they're right 999 out of 1000 times, if that 1 in 1000 error is the end of humanity, that's pretty bad.
EY is not arguing that the end of humanity is merely possible. He is arguing that it is obviously the most likely outcome and will almost certainly happen a very short time after AGI is invented. That's a much harder case to make.
An important concept behind this is Omohundro's Basic Drives. Any maximizing agent with a goal will try to acquire more resources, resist being shut off, resist having its goal changed, create copies of itself, and improve its algorithm. If it is possible to maximize its goal in a way that will not guarantee humanity's flourishing, then we all die, guaranteed.
If you want something more spelled out, I'll refer to Tim Urban's explanation. It's quite long, but is about as detailed as you can ask for. https://waitbutwhy.com/2015/01/artificial-intelligence-revol...
Aren't humans/biological life a counterexample? Simple bacteria are clearly maximizing agents, and cyanobacteria did infact almost destroy all life on earth by filling the entire planet with toxic oxygen.
We've known how to improve ourselves via selective breeding yet vanishingly few humans are proponents. We and and other intelligent animals have a wide variety of goals, and even animals sometimes share food across species.
The evidence just doesn't seem to support this concept of Basic Drives. If anything, the evidence (and common sense) seems to suggest that the more intelligent the organism, the more easily and more often it ignores its basic drives.
Intellectual capability and alignment are orthogonal - the former doesn’t get you the latter for free.
Most people new to this issue don’t intuitively grasp this at first.
Remember that ML models are also subject to selection. If they're not useful/beneficial to us, we stop running them.
Some others in this thread have linked to stuff (it's variations/examples on the paperclip maximizer argument).
I'd be curious why John Carmack thinks these risks are unlikely (he thinks fast take off is not something to worry about) - is that because he thinks we'll get some sort of trainable AGI first or something else? There are also some other substantive disagreements here: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wAczufCpMdaamF9fy/my-objecti...
Here's my take on the implications of not having fast takeoff, a secretly antagonistic AGI will be constrained to cooperation, and slowly leeching compute resources towards its goal until it is able to aquire enough resources to confidently sprint towards the inflection point. This could mean teaching us how to build better semiconductor foundries, how to create nuclear fusion energy sources, how to educate our youth to better fit into those jobs, slightly alter our culture's value systems over time via astroturfing to be more sympathetic, cooperative, trusting, and less vigilant towards these AI systems, how to build more robust computing systems so we stop needing to detect when something goes wrong (because it already has 99.9999% uptime).
I believe slow takeoff is actually worse in some sense, because it is a hell of a lot harder to detect, and humans tend to get complacent and apathetic when something "just works" for decades, even if it has been plotting since the beginning.
There are brains, therefore there can be created an artificial super-brain. Artificial super-brain might have goals which don't align with human brain and we will have no way to understand or control the situation.
Two unrelated facts, which together mean that we should be careful with experimenting with the science working towards super-brains. Just a single super-brain could end us.
We cant even figure out how to simulate a flatworm - and the connectome is solved.
How or how difficult, or when are all questions that follow from that first premise (that it is possible). I don't really make strong claims about any of the implementation details beyond it being possible. Though again, what we're seeing doesn't look like failure to me.
If you think it is possible though, then there's a strong argument that trying to work on alignment now is probably a good idea because people are notoriously bad at predicting when advances will happen (and the downside risk of unaligned superintelligent AGI is likely very bad).
https://intelligence.org/2017/10/13/fire-alarm/
> "Two: History shows that for the general public, and even for scientists not in a key inner circle, and even for scientists in that key circle, it is very often the case that key technological developments still seem decades away, five years before they show up.
"In 1901, two years before helping build the first heavier-than-air flyer, Wilbur Wright told his brother that powered flight was fifty years away.
"In 1939, three years before he personally oversaw the first critical chain reaction in a pile of uranium bricks, Enrico Fermi voiced 90% confidence that it was impossible to use uranium to sustain a fission chain reaction. I believe Fermi also said a year after that, aka two years before the denouement, that if net power from fission was even possible (as he then granted some greater plausibility) then it would be fifty years off; but for this I neglected to keep the citation.
"And of course if you’re not the Wright Brothers or Enrico Fermi, you will be even more surprised. Most of the world learned that atomic weapons were now a thing when they woke up to the headlines about Hiroshima. There were esteemed intellectuals saying four years after the Wright Flyer that heavier-than-air flight was impossible, because knowledge propagated more slowly back then."
Finally, to me, nuclear reactions are kind of the opposite of AGI: I think it's vastly easier to blow something up (increase entropy) than to create an intelligence capable of understanding and improving itself (decreasing entropy - possibly at an accelerating rate).
Even if people were trying to constrain its access seriously I think that's unlikely to work (hard to contain a superintelligence that wants to not be contained - it's possible to trick a chimp to go into a room and the delta in intelligence between a human and a superintelligence is way bigger than us and chimps).
Instead I mostly observe people not really understanding the e-risk argument, focused mostly on small stuff that doesn't matter as much (AI language, bias). The people developing the tech connecting it to the internet and expanding capabilities, giving it access to code/training ability to write code, preparing massive datacenters for it, etc.
All of this without really understanding how to align it or what it's actual internal goals really are.
> "Just because some implementation of a universal turing machine can simulate intelligence doesn't mean it can do it well enough to survive the real world."
This could be true, but I would bet against it - and the downside risk of being wrong (potentially complete extinction) means it seems worth being way more cautious about it than we (humanity broadly) are observed being.
The simplified argument is:
- Superintelligent AGI that can modify itself in pursuit of a goal is possible.
- If that AGI is not aligned with human goals it very likely ends in the end of humanity.
- We have no idea how to align an AGI or even really observe what it's true state/goals are. Without this capability if we stumble upon creating an AGI capable of improving itself in such a way that leads to super intelligence before we have alignment, it's game over.
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For point 1, that seems like the consensus view now (though it wasn't until recently). I think it seems obvious, but my general arguments would be humans aren't special, brains are everywhere in nature, biology is constrained in ways other systems are not (birth, energy usage, etc.)
For point 2, in pursuit of whatever its goal is, even a 'dumb' goal that happens to satisfy its reward functions, humanity will likely either try to stop it (and then be an obstacle) or at a minimum will just be in the way - like an anthill destroyed in the construction of a dam.
Point 3 is not controversial.
The dismissals from Tyler Cohen and Pinker are mostly just relying on heuristics which are often right, but even if they're right 999 out of 1000 times, if that 1 in 1000 error is the end of humanity, that's pretty bad. Most of the time a disease not a pandemic, but sometimes it is. I've read some of what Pinker has written about it, he doesn't understand EY's arguments (imo). Cohen's recent blog post could be summarized as "we'll likely see an end to peacetime and increasing global instability, might as well get AGI out of it". Just because things don't usually result in human extinction doesn't mean they can't.