Here's my take on the implications of not having fast takeoff, a secretly antagonistic AGI will be constrained to cooperation, and slowly leeching compute resources towards its goal until it is able to aquire enough resources to confidently sprint towards the inflection point. This could mean teaching us how to build better semiconductor foundries, how to create nuclear fusion energy sources, how to educate our youth to better fit into those jobs, slightly alter our culture's value systems over time via astroturfing to be more sympathetic, cooperative, trusting, and less vigilant towards these AI systems, how to build more robust computing systems so we stop needing to detect when something goes wrong (because it already has 99.9999% uptime).
I believe slow takeoff is actually worse in some sense, because it is a hell of a lot harder to detect, and humans tend to get complacent and apathetic when something "just works" for decades, even if it has been plotting since the beginning.
Some others in this thread have linked to stuff (it's variations/examples on the paperclip maximizer argument).
I'd be curious why John Carmack thinks these risks are unlikely (he thinks fast take off is not something to worry about) - is that because he thinks we'll get some sort of trainable AGI first or something else? There are also some other substantive disagreements here: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wAczufCpMdaamF9fy/my-objecti...