That's theoretical. I highly doubt anyone extends that much effort to target typewriters anymore. The best they could probably do is match a series of messages to the same typewriter. Though they might not even be able to do that, because the law-enforcement skills to match typewriter documents to each other have also probably nearly completely atrophied.
You're probably more likely to be caught by being the weirdo still buying typewriter ribbons.
> I mean, photocopiers have the exact same technology
They absolutely do not have the "exact same technology. That's totally, 100% wrong.
I would agree, but then I also would have agreed with this sentiment about much of what Snowden revealed. If you want to be paranoid, may as well go all in.
What Snowden revealed is way more believable than the government continuing to invest tons of effort into profiling typewriters. The whole thing with Snowden was that his leaks confirmed a lot of things reasonable people speculated.
Might be hard to read or remember but it sure does stand out.
I am not advocating for typewriters as such, but there was the story about India ordering thousands after Snowden's revelations, and I just wanted to say why that is silly. If I want to find out something really badly, I will, so there is no reason to believe that people who have more resources cannot do the same.
Couldn't someone still capture them from the untrusted hardware, wait until quantum computer technology is available, then decrypt them?
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography
I get the desire to control the entire chain, but nowadays you’re surrounded by cameras and microphones 24/7, every smart device is a surveillance sleeper agent waiting for the magic word. Certificate chains are the least of your worries.
Privacy already is (mostly) lost and the battle now simply is to reliably establish authenticity that can't be impersonated or doubted. That's where encryption remains helpful.
Authenticity isn't important if the message content can be verified. It can even pose a danger. People like to attack the messenger, especially if he has a point.
Don't know about your devices, but mine do not put me under surveillance. Smartphones are critical, but even those are controllable. If you are in public you won't know, but otherwise you can be reasonably safe.
Yes, it's Coreboot with disabled and neutralized Intel ME.
> Your usb stack?
No, it's isolated in a dedicated, hardware-virtualized VM on Qubes OS.
> Your network card firmware?
Same as above. And it's FLOSS.
> surrounded by cameras and microphones
For those, I have hardware kill switches. On the phone, too.
Pinky swear.
Sure, because I have the complete source code for all three of those things:
Deliberately inserted malware, laying in plain sight in source code, is an existential risk for a company with a reputation like IBM's. Of course, there isn't a 100% guarantee of it being noticed, but a 1% chance of that happening is enough for them to tell the spooks to fuck off.
Special Access Programs only work because God-mode coprocessors like the Intel ME ensure zero risk of blowback for the manufacturer. Force them to have skin in the game and they aren't pushovers anymore.
Can you? If we're going this far, you can't trust the compiler either.
Like, the chances of someone sneaking something terrible into an open source kernel seem lower than of any of the hardware coming out of China to be poisoned.
what causes you to think that?
For example, how often has there been something terrible inside an OS kernel? How much poisoned Chinese hardware are you aware of?
Fundamentally, all security is based on trusting somebody, understanding their incentives and intentions and weighing risk and reward. An excellent book on the subject is Bruce Schneier's "Liars and Outliers" https://www.schneier.com/books/liars-and-outliers/.
If caught red handed, they will always say it depends on how you define where both "ends" begin.
Do not trust a cloud service that you have not developed and deployed yourself.
You may trust untrusted hardware with your encrypted content, but only if you have given it your content pre-encrypted by yourself, not trusted a third party to encrypt it on your behalf. Obviously, this excludes mobile devices.
Do not trust a tree of certificates if you cannot trust the root certificate because it belongs to an organization that is in a jurisdiction where people may be interested in what you have written and said in your encrypted message.
Don't trust old-school typewriters and the postal system either. Letters are routinely opened and typewriters can be matched. For example, the Stasi (secret police of the former GDR - German "Democratic" Republic) had an archive of type samples of all sold models of typewriters for re-identification of political pamphlets.
You can trust a few things: You can trust your Linux box with your self-compiled kernel (no 3rd party drivers), at least as long as it is not on a network. To build a safe environment, you could start there, taking a defensive approach. Remember, last time the paranoid turned out to be naive when Snowden revealed the real status quo in 2013 (ten years ago, when I couldn't buy a 1 TB USB stick).