> This week, we discovered...
So they found out about it sometime between Monday and Thursday, and rotated it Thursday evening.
Security issues are obviously very important, but equally I would be worried if they started acting impulsively immediately after discovering the issue, because there would not have been time to understand the problem and consider the options. If you jump on a solution without giving it a bit of thought first it's too easy to exacerbate the situation.
I don't know how long exactly, but in theory you can subscribe to a stream of ALL events happening at GitHub by fetching from this endpoint: https://api.github.com/events
With these events you know what new repositories are created and what changes are pushed, so you can fetch every new change. Once something gets pushed to a public repository, it's very likely that some spider will have fetched it within a few minutes.
Wow I am shocked that they allow "firehose" access not only for free, but without even an API key.
Given enough disk and bandwidth, does this mean you could keep your own copy of all of github? I'd love to be able to grep the whole thing.
Are we talking 1TB/year, 10TB/year, 100TB/year?
"This week, we discovered that GitHub.com’s RSA SSH private key was briefly exposed in a public GitHub repository"
> We have no reason to believe that the exposed key was abused and took this action out of an abundance of caution.
This is not verifiable, right? As the authentication method has no public and required revocation source, and given that the key, if having leaked, likely will be acquired by an authoritarian government, they can selectively MITM organizations and users that are not aware of this blog post.
- When exactly was the key leaked? Yesterday? A month ago?
- How long was it visible for? And no, "briefly" doesn't cut it.
- Did any internet traffic reach the page while it was exposed? We know you log everything, so it is a yes or no answer.
If any of these answers were pretty, I imagine they would have explicitly included them in the post.