> the issue with this variant of reductivism is its enticingly easy to explain in one direction, but it tends to fall apart if you try to go the other way!
If by this you mean the hard problem of consciousness remains unexplained by any of the physical processes underlying it, and that it subjectively "feels like" Cartesian dualism with a separate spirit-substance even though absolutely all of the objective evidence points to reality being material substance monism, then I agree.
Eliza feels like a primitive form of LLMs' consciousness.
A simple program that prints "Hey! How ya doin'?" feels like a primitive form of Eliza.
A pile of interconnected NAN gates, fed with electricity, feels like a primitive form of a program.
A single transistor feels like a primitive form of a NAN gate.
A pile of dirty sand feels like a primitive form of a transistor.
So... yeah, pretty much?
Ill just say: the issue with this variant of reductivism is its enticingly easy to explain in one direction, but it tends to fall apart if you try to go the other way!