Arguing Monty Fall is 50/50 is just the fallback position of unrepentant Monty Hall halfers, CMV.
I think it matters a lot, and I suspect this is the issue that Monty Hall nonbelievers (who think the chance is 50% even if the host knows) are struggling with, but from the opposite direction of you.
Let's try to work out the probabilities:
You randomly pick box (let's call it A), 1/3 chance of being correct. The host randomly randomly opens one of the other two (let's call it B). 1/3 chance he opens the box with the prize, invalidating the game. 2/3 chance he opens an empty box. If he picks an empty box (2/3 chance), each of the other boxes (A and the remaining box, let's call it C) still has 1/2 chance of holding the prize, so 1/2 * 2/3 = 1/3 chance each a priori, but 1/2 after eliminating the 1/3 chance of invalidating the game.
So now we've got 1/3 chance of A having the prize, 1/3 of the game being invalid, 1/3 of the third box holding the prize. After eliminating the invalid game, there's still an equal chance of A and C holding the prize.
When the host knows which box holds the prize and uses that information to always pick an empty box (which he always can, because there will always be at least one unpicked empty box), there's no chance of invalidating the game, so the remaining box has a 2/3 chance of holding the prize.
> The problem states that the host does not reveal the prize, not that the game is void if he does.
Fair point, but the host can only reliable pick an empty box if he knows which boxes are empty. If he doesn't, there's always a chance of him accidentally opening the box with the prize. If he opens an empty box by luck, then you dodged that 1/3 chance of invalidating the game. You're now in the changed probability space given that the host didn't accidentally invalidate the game. Each box had an a 1/3 priori chance of being right, but given the 2/3 chance that the host didn't invalidate the game, they now each have a (1/3)/(2/3)=1/2 chance of being the correct box.
It is the knowledge of the host that eliminates the chance of an invalid game and puts the 2/3 chance on the remaining box.
> If the host "does not" reveal the prize, then it really doesn't matter why.
It does. You dodged a bullet, and that has an influence on the remaining probabilities. In the original Monty Hall problem, the host provides extra information, in Monty Fall, he doesn't, but you dodge a bullet. That difference matters.
You're ignoring the difference by posing a non mathematical objection to the statement of the problem. This is like having a physics problem about frictionless spherical cows and objecting that cows aren't really frictionless and spherical, and giving an answer for a different problem. Sure you might come up with a valid answer for your different problem, but it isn't a valid answer for your original problem. Likewise 1/2 is a valid answer to the invalidated trials version of the problem here, but not a valid answer to the problem as stated, which remains 2/3.
In the trial invalidation version of the problem, but not in the problem as stated. The problem as stated provides, the host does not reveal a car (or your original door).
Let me put it another way. If the question had asked, "Conditional on the host not revealing a car (or your original door), what is the probability of winning if you switch?", then that too would be 1/2. My problem is that this is not what is asked. We don't get to answer an easier or different version of the problem. And the reason it matters is because people start spouting woo about how the host's knowledge or intentions are what mattered, when that isn't true at all. What matters, as you have demonstrated and I have tried to clarify (we aren't really disagreeing), is whether we are exploring the conditional probability in the uniform distribution over a sample space where the host might open another door (1/2), or the probability in the uniform distribution over a sample space where he cannot (2/3). If one denies the difference between these versions of the problem, one ends up in woo-space where the host's knowledge or intentions matter. They don't.
Knowledge and intentions don't matter? They most certainly do.
Imagine a third version of the problem (I'm afraid I don't have a good name for it) where the host actively tries to lure you away from the correct answer, and only opens an empty box if you've picked the correct box. Now, if you pick a box and the host opens an empty box, you should absolutely not switch, because the remaining box has 0% of being the right one.
Knowledge and intentions matter. The real problem happens when you don't know what strategy the host is using.
These are the valid answers to the two problems. It's not clear to me what you think I'm ignoring, but if you can make that clear, perhaps I can explain my meaning a bit better.
It is because when the player has picked a goat door, the host is restricted to reveal specifically which has the only other goat, but when the player has picked the car door, the host is free to reveal any of the other two, we don't know which in advance, they are equally likely for us, because both would have goats in that case.
For example, if you select door 1 and he reveals door 2, it was 100% sure that he would have taken #2 if the correct were #3, as he wouldn't have had another option. Instead, we couldn't ensure that he would have opened door 2 in case the correct were yours, as he could have preferred to reveal door 3 in that case (each of them would have had 50% chance of being removed). So, from the times that you start selecting door 1, it tends to happen with twice the frequency that he opens door 2 once the correct is #3 than once the correct is #1.
Instead, if the host does not know the locations and his revelation is random, he cannot make that distinction of revealing one door more than the other depending on the prize location, precisely because he does not know where it is. If you pick door 1, you cannot say that he will open specifically door 2 with more frequency when door 3 is the correct than when door 1 is the correct. If he decides to open door 2, that choice is independent of where the car is.
If, on the other hand, the presenter didn't know which box is the right one, and just opens one of the other two boxes at random (with a 1/3 chance of opening the box with the prize), then, if the opened box turns out to be empty, the chance of the remaining box being the right one drops to 50%.
The difference between these two scenarios becomes obvious if we expand it to 100 boxes: You pick a box, 1% chance of being right. Of the other 99, at least 98 are empty. The presenter knows which, opens the 98 empty boxes, and now there's a 99% chance of the remaining box being the right one.
Other scenario: The presenter opens 98 boxes, not knowing which are empty, so he has a 98% chance of opening the box with the prize. On the unlikely chance that all are empty, there prize must have been in either the box you picked, or the remaining box, but we still have no information about which it is, so there's a 50% that you're holding the right box.
Of course if you don't know whether the presenter knows, and you don't know if he was lucky that the 98 boxes he opened were all empty, or that he knew, then the situation becomes quite a bit more complicated, but the chance of switching being the best option is going to be larger than 50%.
How much? Let's say there's an a priori 50% chance that he knows or doesn't know. If he doesn't know, then opening 98 empty boxes is pretty unlikely, so it's pretty likely that he knows. It's probably possible to calculate those odds, but I'm not going to try that now.
And if the presenter's behaviour changes depending on whether you picked the right box or not, for example he uses his knowledge to actively tempt you away from the right box, then all bets are off. Or maybe him opening another box is proof that you've got the right one. Or maybe that's what he wants you to think...