They are, but in practice they are muddled together and I suspect people are going to create subnets with IPv6 in the name of security. In IPv4 NAT is used to make sure your laptop isn't exposed to random script kiddies trying to scan for vulnerable services behind your router. A fun exercise is to plug a RaspberryPi up directly to a public facing IP address and log every packet it receives. Then give those scripts a few services to detect (HTTP server, SSH server, etc.) and look at how the traffic shifts from scanning for ports to scanning for vulnerabilities. Being connected directly to the public internet is a real eye opening experience.
I do believe future IPv6 networks will have gateway machines and/or bastions that are connected to the public internet with public IPv6 addresses. And then they'll have an interior network that they use NAT for. Individual machines will not be routable or discoverable without going through a bastion/gateway that explicitly controls the flow of traffic into a network. Not because this is the ideal way to structure an IPv6 network, but because this pattern is going to carry over from the IPv4 world and there is a lot of momentum in tribal knowledge using NAT as a form of firewall.
NAT does nothing for that. Those incoming connections are dropped on the WAN interface before NAT would even be involved. Which is why it works exactly the same way regardless of whether the destination IP for that traffic was IPv4 or IPv6.
That isn't really feasible with IPV6 though is it? The smallest IPV6 subnet is 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 addresses, so even if you setup a Pi fully open to the world with default passwords the chance of someone scanning it is basically zero. That type of scanning only works because the IPV4 range is so small (& you can efficiently ignore large parts of it like the US DOD space, private addresses, etc).
[0]: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Targeted+IPv6+Scans+Using+pool.nt...
Behind a NAT, observers can only make that connection (using only addresses) for the network as a whole, instead of an individual device on the network. So the privacy extensions are weaker than NAT
(If the IPv6 privacy extensions used a different address for each connection, they would be more like NAT in this regard.)
That said, other observable clues still allow connections from a single device to be associated, NAT or not. There's TCP OS fingerprinting for example, and the close timing of related connections.
In this scenario it's a lot more work trying to map out your infrastructure than to try performing a MITM connection against some of your outbound traffic.
With any usable N, a clever observer would still easily work out what you were doing and still map out your infrastructure.
There is a whole industry built around network traffic analysis.
What makes you think it doesn't happen on the internet?
The ISPs have the ability to see what is on your network by IPv4 egress. They have been able to do this for a decade.
Worrying that an IPv6 address divulges the network forgets that IPv4 devices betray their existence through DNS, their destinations and other network behavior.
The ISPs know.
2. You can't say anything about the percentage with just the absolute market value. At the very least you need something else to compare it too.
Please, be serious.
So, I mean, I dunno, 2 billion dollars seems serious to me, but maybe we just have different barometers for what counts as "serious amounts of money". Especially considering these devices that are like $300.
Finally, might I remind you of the guidelines? in particular:
> When disagreeing, please reply to the argument instead of calling names. "That is idiotic; 1 + 1 is 2, not 3" can be shortened to "1 + 1 is 2, not 3."
Many of these routers are managed by the ISP using protocols such as TR-069, several ISPs have already been found to not only manage the devices but also monitor certain data including what devices are present.
More reasonable is to use new address for each connection. Then nobody can tell if 10 addresses and 10 connections are one device or ten.
You've saved the translation in the router, but now routing lookups and ARP caches have grown by TEMP_VALID_LIFETIME / TEMP_PREFERRED_LIFETIME.
What are valid values in the scenario you are proposing? The defaults are 1 week / 1 day, so 7X. If you chose to rotate each second, and say allowed addresses to only be valid for say 20 minutes, this still appears to be a ~1200X blowup in routing overheads.
They have not?
The global routing table size for ipv6 at max is a /32 (if i remember correctly) every customer gets a /56 prefix to use in their network, so the routing table entry would still be the same, no matter how many addresses you use to cycle through in your /64.
ARP caches do not exist in IPv6, and Neighbour discovery does not have the same "cache" mechanism as ARP does, it uses an entirely different mechanism for neighbour discovery. (which is also far more lightweight considering it is using multicast, compared to the broadcast of ARP).
Right now, my macOS system has four publicly-routable IPv6 IPs, all random. New ones are generated, and old ones removed, regularly.
https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/deploy360/2014/pri...
What's wrong with a firewall that blocks everything by default, yet all your devices have a public IP?