The virtue ethicist believes it is bad to be in a habit to lie because being predisposed to lying is opposed to the virtue of the truth. We've all known people who lie by habit and they are unpleasant and vicious to be around. I don't know if most virtue ethicists (who don't also fall into the natural lawyer camp, below) would say it is per se bad to lie, but most would say it is vicious.
The natural lawyer believes that speech has as its natural end telling the truth and therefore it is contra naturam to lie. See the almost-impossibly-extended discussion here, for that: https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm
For all of these groups, there has variously been admitted something like an "equivocal statement"---a statement which has some interpretation that is technically true, but not the interpretation that the speaker knows will be taken by the listener as a falsehood. For example, my friend invites me out on Friday and rather than saying I'd rather be at home, I say, "I have something going on that night." He takes it to mean that I have other plans, but I don't. But technically, breathing is "something going on" so I haven't lied. (Whether your social relationships will stand your doing this is another matter ;))
I'm personally fall in something like the virtue ethicist camp, but I do believe sometimes, in justice, a lie must be said, and not all of those situations can be covered by an equivocation.
This is true. But I don’t think anyone makes the point that someone should lie all the time. Especially not that everyone should lie all the time.
I think that there’s an ethical argument for lieing for some greater purpose (eg, a spy working for the Underground Railroad).
It goes deeper than you might expect. There are good reasons to think that it might indeed be unethical to lie, even when the consequences are bad. I don't necessarily agree with the premises involved, but it's worth researching rather than dismissing out of hand. Especially since consequentialism has problems of its own, and it's a way to get an alternative take on the criticisms of consequentialism.
Personally, I'd like to see deontologists accept that lying isn't such a great example, and instead take up a different one. There can be good deontological approaches that accept that consequences can be part of rules.
Somebody knocks on the door. A man opens it and finds a man in a Nazi uniform standing there, looking impatient.
"Are there any Jews inside?" the Nazi asks.
"Yes, several. They are in my attic," the home owner replies.
The Nazi takes the Jews away into the windy, rainy afternoon, and nobody ever sees them again.
The home owner feels good about himself for being so truthful, and years later, looks down on everybody who criticizes him for his decision that day, thinking, "those lying Jews, trying to make those Nazis think they weren't here."
Is the home owner a good person?
commentary: The home owner is not a good person
I'd be curious to probe a framework that thinks it is, while not holding that axiomatically. As someone who leans heavily into consequentialism, I can think of plenty of times lying can lead to a net positive for everyone. Likewise, there are harmful truths that should be suppressed.
That suggests to me that lying is, in-of-itself, amoral. The effect of the lie (or the intent, if you swing that way) determines whether it's ethical or not. Who is harmed by your assuming a fabricated identity? For the vast majority of people, who exactly you are matter little. So it's hard to suggest they are harmed by having an incorrect model of you. It may be manipulative to those trying to piece together your identity, but being doxxed can and often does lead to harm befalling your person, so your lies against them can be plainly justified under self-defense.