How does fde make a laptop useless to be stolen?

Because the actually valuable content (the data) is protected, while the disposable part (the hardware) is taken. If you have a responsible backup habit, disaster recovery is as simple as restoring another device. FDE gives you permission to shrug-off lost devices and data, something an unencrypted laptop can't quite offer.

You've got it the other way around: for a thief stealing a laptop whilee you're careless in a coffee shop, the actually valuable content is the hardware, while the data is the disposable part.

Sometimes the data can be valuable as well (perhaps you can be blackmailed, or perhaps they can steal additional things from your bank accounts etc), but that is far from guaranteed. The hardware has a clear value though.

Most people won't shrug off the loss of a material investment of over a thousand dollars.

Thieves don't steal devices to sell the data. They steal devices to sell the device.

It's not about the thieves intent. It's about the person that ends up with a stolen or recycled device that wasn't properly wiped and now has a bunch of sensitive data on the hard drive (you can find tons of stories like that).

Also industrial espionage is a thing and but I agree with you that's probably a minority of thefts.

Yes, I know what FDE is good for. But it doesn't prevent or deter anyone from stealing the device, as Activation Lock does. FDE has no utility in reducing the value of a stolen device, because they can be simply reset to factory settings.

I could also deter thieves from stealing Macbooks by engineering it to detonate the battery when an unauthorized user takes it. That doesn't make it right, or justify the collateral damage caused by the feature.

Booby traps are illegal because they harm indiscriminately.

Sorry, at what point did anyone suggest that turning the MacBook into a bomb is right or justified.

It does in combination with with Activation Lock or similar technology that is available x86 devices.

The claim above being disputed is that FDE alone makes it useless to steal a laptop.

Your data is valuable to you, but unless you happen to be Hunter Biden it's probably valueless to anyone else. On the other hand, your hardware is valuable to a thief who can resell it.

Full-disk encryption protects your data. Activation locking dissuades theft.

Personally, I want both.

Sure, but as soon as they remove it from their iCloud account that activation lock is removed. (yes, you can connect to wifi before you enter the password)

The only time this is not true is when the previous owner has intentionally marked the device lost or stolen in the find-my App/Site.

I think a lot of this backlash is recyclers getting stolen goods.

(Also, iCloud lock is bypassed if there is an MDM, like in a corporate setting- then the icloud lock can be remotely enabled/disabled by the organisations IT department)

Traditional disk encryption doesn't dissuade from stealing my device in any way. It's my device and I want it bricked if it's not in my hands.

> Traditional disk encryption serves your protection perfectly well.

Exactly. I don't need Apple to protect me from thieves, I need the computer that I bought to protect my information.

Disable "Find My" in iCloud settings and it works as normal.

You will likely get a little bit of Herd Immunity because Apple devices are known to be miserable to steal.

But otherwise it will work as you expect, just add some Filevault for FDE.

If you're advocating to remove these features for the rest of us, then as an Apple user: no thanks.

> If you're advocating to remove these features for the rest of us

Not at all. They obviously need to be better documented or changed though since so many legitimate resales are being affected.

As someone who was mugged on the DC subway for an iPhone about 10 years ago, hard disagree.