> This machine was compromised on December 16, 2022. The malware was not detected by our antivirus software
That's not blaming that's telling people that their antivirus didn't detect it. If that wasn't there, people would be talking about why they didn't use X antivirus which would probably detect it.
> CircleCI have sufficient logging, however, failed to do fraud analysis to detect irregular access.
This is a significant move of the goalposts. Of course CircleCI messed up, but to go back to the OP's point of "nobody should have that much access to production", well that's just not true.
However, if they need this, you need a detection mechanism. It doesn't have to be advanced, a threshold on the number of production keys accessed per day is sufficient. It should raise an alarm to the manager in question, who can then confirm this is expected behaviour given the task assigned to the employee in question.
Giving access to customer data to your staff by default is a design decision and can be avoided. However, in the end, it is a cost-benefit analysis where you have to decide how much you care about your customer's security. I have worked for enough start-ups/growth companies to know the value put on customers' security is sometimes shockingly low.
This is why Antiviruses are totally useless, they're incredibly easy to bypass.
Not all attacks are targeted and AV can detect abnormal behaviour. Regardless, having the operating system do proper sandboxing is much more valuable than trying to fix it after the fact with AV.
They also point their finger at anti-virus for not detecting the malware. That is a lame excuses. Professional malware developers will check if their product goes undetected by the major anti-virus providers. Anti-virus should not be relied upon to protect against sophisticated attacks