We should've probably started with the fact that I despise security policies based on provenance, chains of trust, public key infrastructure, and third parties. This kind of "security" feels extremely fragile and unnecessarily centralized. We somehow live with how SSH identifies servers by their keys, with no third-party verification, and consider that an okay level of security. Why can't we use the same approach for TLS and for executable signatures? What's so fundamentally different that third parties are now required?
Self signing is open to too much abuse. The whole point of signing is that the provenance can be verified (yes, checksums are a thing) and that the signing can be revoked should something bad happen. Notarising code is the process of a third party verifying your identity. So rather than saying, “hey, you can trust me”, you are asking a third party to vet and prove that you are trustworthy. If you can’t see the value in that for all parties - including the most important party, your customers - then that’s up to you. No sane SOC will allow unsigned or self-signed binaries. Consumers with the slightest bit of savvy will not run unsigned or self-signed binaries, and OS vendors need to take care of the rest. Thinking of the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability triad, your solution is unworkable.
> Consumers with the slightest bit of savvy will not run unsigned or self-signed binaries
I'm a "consumer with the slightest bit of savvy" and I despise code signing schemes that care about the signing identity, so you're already wrong. I absolutely will run unsigned and self-signed binaries. I trust myself and my own judgement more than I do anyone else in the entire universe.
It ought to! I'd love to see this in Linux and the BSD's too. Signing applications and binaries should be the norm.
> And before Let's Encrypt and other similar free automatic CAs came along, SSL/TLS was very niche.
Let's Encrypt came about to help with security. Happy to hear arguments pro a similar service for application signing, but will have to follow similar, or tighter restrictions and you'd still be at the whim of third party.
> I like Android's security model better. You sign your apk with a self-signed certificate.
That is most definitely not a security policy. Self-signing is no different to not signing at all. There is no provenance, no chain-of-trust.