This is the opposite of what happened. The engineers were confronted with a novel and unexpected problem, and instead of following procedure (which they lack access to) they applied "creative problem solving skills". From TFA:
> Although it was possible to install the post-SB fuel lines and hydraulic pump with a pre-SB hydraulic tube, the tube would rest against one of the fuel lines at a point where it rounded a 90-degree bend close to the pump. Aware that the plane could not be dispatched unless there was clearance between the tubes, the technicians torqued a nut on the end of the hydraulic tube until it rose approximately 0.635 mm off the face of the fuel line.
Torquing a nut so that the hydraulic tube isn't technically rubbing against the fuel line is pretty creative and seems to solve the problem. But it didn't take into account pressure and vibration while in flight, and almost caused the death of 306 people.
If 0.635mm (an odd number itself which happens to be exactly 1/40th of an inch, or "25 thous" in American sizes) and they let it go that sounds really odd. That's literally the size of a grain of sand. If the concern is rubbing, sure that implies it will move during flight.
> These are the kinds of failures you get when you try to proceduralize everything with foolproof procedures
> Had the technicians
The report makes it clear that the problem was their lack of access to the relevant details, not that the process was defective. If they had seen the need to replace the hydraulic hose, they would have presumably changed it or flagged the problem to someone higher up.
> The maintenance people didn't even know they were making a judgement call.
It seems like they did. If you replace a part and something is touching, you are not trusted in aviation to try and make some space with a bit of fiddling for exactly this reason. They did make a judgment call. If they had relied on the process, again, they could have queried why the new pump was touching when the old one wasn't.
"Read and follow the directions exactly" is a rule that is written in blood.
Aviation safety is utterly dependent on procedures, checklists, run-books and processes. The fact that things sometimes fall through the cracks is no argument against them.
These are the kinds of failures you get when you try to proceduralize everything with foolproof procedures, checklists, run-books, processes, etc. The maintenance people didn't even know they were making a judgement call.
Had the technicians sleeved the offending tubes with appropriate chafing gear and secured them to reduce movement as would be common place in more earthly situations instead of trying to get it "technically in spec" without thinking about the implications of what they were actually doing this problem may very well have been averted. But maintenance people in aviation aren't really ever exercising those creative problem solving skills since it's such a book driven workflow they're always dealing with so of course they missed the forest for the trees (not that they would have been allowed to implement a one-off fix like that).