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Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by charcircuit on Thursday December 01, 2022 @03:31AM (#33813768)
It seems like everyone was biased against TrustCor because they didn't want their privacy violated.

A separate company used an SDK which later was classified as malware and now TrustCor is no longer trusted. That is pretty unfair.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by stefan_ on Thursday December 01, 2022 @03:56AM (#33813931)
Since there was substantial evidence that these were one and the same company. The CA had no substantial public certificate issuing program regardless so kicking it out was an easy decision either way (and begs the question what exactly it is they were doing to justify the multi million dollar operating costs of a root CA).
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by charcircuit on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:14AM (#33814050)
>there was substantial evidence

circumstantial evidence, but nothing that was definitive

>The CA had no substantial public certificate issuing program

So just because they don't have enough customers they should be removed? This just promotes centralization of trust.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by DoctorNick on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:21AM (#33814086)
It really doesn’t matter if it was circumstantial or not. When presented with such evidence, the TrustCor rep was extremely evasive. This isn’t a court of law; if a Root CA can’t be up-front about explaining evidence that calls their trust into question, then they cannot be trusted and deserve to have their certificates yanked.
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by dcow on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:32AM (#33814154)
They were under attack. I actually read the whole thread and they were crystal clear.
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by ranguna on Thursday December 01, 2022 @05:00AM (#33814343)
Yeah I personally feel for the rep, they were indeed under attack. But there is no going around it, a company that advertised a product as being e2e encrypted when it really was not, having multiple levels of ties with the CA was enough to deem the CA as unfit.

I agree with this conclusion because the CA ecosystem is a fragile one if not governed strictly, since the risks are of the highest concern to the general use of the Internet.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by netheril96 on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:53AM (#33814294)
> circumstantial evidence, but nothing that was definitive

CAs should be assumed guilty until proven otherwise.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by simplotek on Thursday December 01, 2022 @05:35AM (#33814559)
> circumstantial evidence, but nothing that was definitive

That's not how things work. The role of a Certificate Authority is to act as a trusted third party. If that third party is unable or unwilling to demonstrate that they are trustworthy then naturally they can't be expected to assume that role.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by hatenberg on Thursday December 01, 2022 @03:59AM (#33813953)
company that violated a tons of people’s privacy with spyware had expectations of privacy
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by charcircuit on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:16AM (#33814059)
What spyware did Trustcor make?
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by hamburglar on Thursday December 01, 2022 @05:38AM (#33814580)
Looks to me like Trustcor’s subsidiary company MsgSafe made an app containing spyware. In addition, that spyware funneled data to a hardcoded url on a MsgSafe server which the Trustcor rep openly admits was only protected by a self-signed cert of unknown origin and was forwarded to unknown destinations as raw tcp packets. In addition, it seems that MsgSafe has a relationship with Trustcor CA that may allow it to obtain arbitrary certificates. This relationship isn’t explained.

There is a lot of doubletalk in the thread that is supposed to somehow lead us to believe that TrustCor CA and MsgSafe are totally separate companies, despite lots of circumstantial evidence that they aren’t.

It also happens to appear that Trustcor and the company that actually created the malware (Measurement Systems) might be closely related and/or the same, owing to a lot of the same names on corporate documents, plus the extremely suspicious fact that the malware in question was only ever distributed elsewhere in obfuscated form, yet somehow MsgSafe seems to have an unobfuscated copy built into their app.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by csande17 on Thursday December 01, 2022 @05:52AM (#33814690)
> There is a lot of doubletalk in the thread that is supposed to somehow lead us to believe that TrustCor CA and MsgSafe are totally separate companies, despite lots of circumstantial evidence that they aren’t.

TrustCor doesn't actually dispute that MsgSafe is the same company as them. For example, here is a press release where they proudly announce they own MsgSafe: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/trustcor-evolves-em...

Instead, what they claim is that these two parts of the business are operated separately. As in, MsgSafe doesn't run on the same servers as the CA. So if a "rogue contractor" adds malware to MsgSafe and it goes undetected for several years, that shouldn't reflect badly on the CA side of the business at all.

(TrustCor was so evasive about this that they seem to have misled most of the people in this thread, though.)

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by hamburglar on Thursday December 01, 2022 @05:57AM (#33814736)
> what they claim is that these two business are operated separately

except that the person doing all this claiming happens to be director of operations for both.

I concede that it isn’t impossible that they have a strong firewall between these two companies. But all the obfuscation, defensiveness, and easily refuted claims don’t really make anyone willing to swallow that story.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by csande17 on Thursday December 01, 2022 @06:04AM (#33814796)
Given that, according to TrustCor's own statements, MsgSafe relies heavily on certificates issued by TrustCor, I don't think there's all that much separation. (There might be, like, a network firewall in between the two server fleets, but even that is doubtful.)
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by hamburglar on Thursday December 01, 2022 @06:12AM (#33814854)
Yeah, reading through this whole saga, one of the things I wondered was whether MsgSafe might actually have the ability to get any certificate it wants from Trustcor CA through this special relationship. If it’s got that kind of permission, all the corporate governance separation in the world isn’t going to matter.
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by shkkmo on Thursday December 01, 2022 @10:54AM (#33817922)
I think the concern is less about MsgSafe getting any certs it wants and more about how shoddy development practices (letting the third party malware SDK be incuded) and business ethics (false E2EE advertising and typo squatting) at MsgSafe reflect on TrustCor's ability to operate a CA given the shared management.

The other large concern is the large number of links between TrustCor and Packet Forensics, Measurement Systems and Volstrom Holdings. Specifically the history of shared ownership, corporate officers, and the inclusion of a the only known non-obfuscated copy of a Measurement Systems malware SDK by a "rogue contractor" for TrustCor.

As an aside, I though it was interesting that Rachel made a point of placing the blame on a contractor and then later admitted that they pay all their "employees" via 1099s.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by treis on Thursday December 01, 2022 @09:56AM (#33817013)
Wake me up when we apply this standard to Apple or Google or Amazon
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by stingraycharles on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:17AM (#33814065)
A company with such an important role on the internet should be extremely transparent, there’s no benefit to the end-users of giving such a company such amount of privacy.
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by bawolff on Thursday December 01, 2022 @04:34AM (#33814172)
You can have privacy or you can be a public root CA.

It's a choose only 1 sort of deal.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by csande17 on Thursday December 01, 2022 @05:35AM (#33814557)
As far as I understand it, there are basically five organizations involved:

1. TrustCor operates "TrustCor CA" and "MsgSafe". TrustCor claims these are completely separate lines of business, but does not dispute that it owns and controls both of them.

2. MsgSafe incorporated a spyware SDK from Measurement Systems into their Android app. TrustCor claims this was done by a rogue contractor (and thus TrustCor had no control over it), and they also claim it wasn't a security breach (implying TrustCor allowed the contractor to do it). Also, MsgSafe claims to offer end-to-end encryption while demonstrably not offering end-to-end encryption.

3. Measurement Systems produced a tracking SDK that is now considered spyware. It has historically shared many high-level employees with TrustCor, including (allegedly) having the same CFO and CEO.

4. Vostrom aka Packet Forensics sells spy equipment that claims to be able to break HTTPS, like you'd be able to do if you had access to a root certificate. They have nebulous ties to both TrustCor and Measurement Systems.

5. TrustCor CA is no longer trusted because of the above, and because its VP is generally unable to answer straightforward questions like "what country are you incorporated in".

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by jrpelkonen on Thursday December 01, 2022 @08:52AM (#33816173)
Small correction to your item 4: In order to MITM https, you need access to root key. Certificates are public.
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by 4str0n0mer on Thursday December 01, 2022 @09:43AM (#33816822)
Another small correction: In order to MITM https, you need access to either a trusted root certificate and key, or a key & certificate with the CA bit set, signed by a valid root CA.
Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by tialaramex on Thursday December 01, 2022 @10:34AM (#33817618)
Assuming you haven't somehow stolen the real site owner's private key, you would need to produce a certificate for that DNS name, signed with a key you do have.

Which is something you could in principle do if you are a trusted root CA. But, this creates a smoking gun. The bogus certificate is a public document, you're always giving it to the client, and for Chrome, Safari, Chromium Edge you are also obliged to publicly log the certificate, where everybody can see it forever, in order to have an SCT (proof of logging) which those browser insist on seeing.

Modern rules require a root CA to disclose any intermediate CAs which are created, even if not currently in use (e.g. because still being tested) and which could issue trusted certificates unless the certificate for the intermediate is technically constrained (which is complicated, but a general purpose CA is not technically constrained for the purpose of this definition)

In practice, most outfits offering "MITM" type capabilities are for corporate environments, education, that sort of thing, where you can say "All employers/ students/ whatever shall trust our our private CA FOO" and then you can MITM using the trusted FOO CA. So this doesn't interact with the Web PKI overseen by m.d.s.policy at all. If you don't want to get MITM'd don't trust some sketchy private CA.

Re:Web browsers drop mysterious company with ties to U.S. mi... by 4str0n0mer on Thursday December 01, 2022 @02:16PM (#33821187)
Maybe a sufficiently crafty vendor of MITM equipment could prevent MITM site certificates that are signed by evil intermediate CAs from appearing in CT logs by filtering access to those CT logs. But it is a risky proposition for the vendor, as you've said.