The attacker may well be using a MacBook Pro, a real one. With a TPM.
Both devices might be very pricey, real, up-to-date machines with TPM and keys and everything you want. The problem is that you can't tell whether the TV is the one TV that the iPhone's owner means to sign in.
Cross device webauthn is the better solution here but it's still vulnerable to the oauth phishing called out here.
This is, as they say, a "known issue". Bearer tokens were defined in RFC 6750 and the thought was that more types of tokens would follow, including some that bound tokens and clients.
It took a while.
RFC 8705, mentioned elsewhere in thread, is one approach.
Another is DPoP, which was discussed at Identiverse in 2022. Here's a presentation about the approach: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cot40RRoPsc
Here's the current draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-... (not sure how close they are to finishing, haven't see much activity on the mailing list about it lately, though).
In the case of CLI app authorization (where you are proving that the refresh + access tokens are being retrieved on the same device that issued the request), the CLI could generate a local key, store it in the TPM/keychain, and then in the browser you could prove that you have access to that same key.
For devices, direct attestation could authenticate the device making the request (e.g. as a legitimate MacBook Pro, or something).
Of course, this depends on services choosing to implement such flows, and when you introduce a requirement for a TPM or similar, plus multiple cryptographic steps, implementors are likely to get lazy and just do something that works but is insecure (or they implement the flows badly with home-rolled crypto).