In his Whren v US decision [0], Scalia gave police the power to stop and search any driver as long as they assert a traffic violation as the pretext for the stop.
In Florida v Riley [1], he agreed that it's not unreasonable to police to use a helicopter to fly into position to see into property not visible from any adjacent building or from adjacent land, assert they can see marijuana, and use that as a pretext for a search warrant.
Sometimes Scalia stood up for the 4th amendment, but he didn't value it more than his prejudices and ideological mission. And that makes it hard for me to say he thought privacy was an individual right.
1: it was a unanimous decision
2: they can’t just assert a traffic violation, there has to be an actual violation of the law.
2a. Imagine a police officer falsely alleged a traffic violation. How much equipment would the pulled-over driver need to have to prove the allegation was false, and how much would it cost to then prove the allegation false? How much equipment would police cars need to prove every allegation was valid? Why are we going to pretend this isn't just another case where the Supreme Court is coaching police on what words they need to put in reports (eg "furtive gestures" to justify a Terry stop, or any traffic violation for this) to allow "us" to have our cake (the 4A) and eat it too (still overpolice Black neighborhoods and chase Black people out of suburbs)?
2b. Should driving 26 mph in a zone with a 25 mph speed limit eliminate protections against a stop and a search? If there are so many traffic laws that it's inevitable that following someone for 10 minutes would yield 1 violation, in what sense do we really have any 4A protection while on the road?
No, Scalia didn't support police flying a helicopter up to your window and pretending they see marijuana then raiding your house. And yeah GP is going to argue that "assert" doesn't mean claiming something that isn't true. But the intention is obvious to the point that it's really difficult to see good faith here.
In Terry v Ohio [0], a plainclothes policeman saw three guys casing a store, saw the outlines of concealed items that he believed to be guns, he stopped and searched them on that basis, and two of the three guys had weapons. The Court ruled that the evidence was admissible and the officer's "reasonable suspicion" made the search lawful, as the officer's safety may be endangered if they're questioning individuals with weapons. Without a reasonable suspicion that an individual has a concealed weapon, though, the frisk is an unconstitutional 4A violation.
In this NY Civil Liberties Union study of stop and frisk data [1], going through NYPD stop and frisk data, from 2003 to 2013, 2585945 frisks were performed but weapons were only found in ~2% (!!!) of frisks. If your suspicions are wrong 98% of the time, it's pretty hard to describe the suspicion as "reasonable", but the SC declared that asserting reasonable suspicion is all it takes to make those unconstitutional searches constitutional.
I'm not anti police, I'm a homicide researcher in Chicago and I have immense respect for a number of the officers and detectives I've worked with. But I can't look at these facts and then pretend they don't exist.
[0] https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/67
[1] https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/stopa...
Whoah, neat, say more?
How's that working out in practice?
Was it not well thought out? Filled with hateful language and stereotypes?
"""I turn now to the ground on which the Court squarely rests its holding: the contention that there is no rational basis for the law here under attack. This proposition is so out of accord with our jurisprudence--indeed, with the jurisprudence of any society we know--that it requires little discussion.
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable," Bowers, supra, at 196--the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity. Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest. The Court today reaches the opposite conclusion. The Texas statute, it says, "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," ante, at 18 (emphasis addded). The Court embraces instead JUSTICE STEVENS' declaration in his Bowers dissent, that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice," ante, at 17. This effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.""" [0]
I'd say it's fairly hateful to compare consensual homosexual sex to bestiality (which cannot be consensual and thus is always rape).
He also spends a lot of time freaking out about the idea that if the Court forbids states from criminalizing homosexuality, it would logically follow that homosexuals are just people and would also be entitled to marriage equality. And he makes it clear how much he is afraid and repulsed by the idea of homosexuals getting the right to marriage equality.
"""Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the best. That homosexuals have achieved some success in that enterprise is attested to by the fact that Texas is one of the few remaining States that criminalize private, consensual homosexual acts. But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I would no more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts--or, for that matter, display any moral disapprobation of them--than I would forbid it to do so. What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new "constitutional right" by a Court that is impatient of democratic change. It is indeed true that "later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress," ante, at 18; and when that happens, later generations can repeal those laws. But it is the premise of our system that those judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best.
One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts--and may legislate accordingly. The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action, so that that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada (in a decision that the Canadian Government has chosen not to appeal). See Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL 34950 (Ontario Ct.App.); Cohen, Dozens in Canada Follow Gay Couple's Lead, Washington Post, June 12, 2003, p. A25. At the end of its opinion--after having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence--the Court says that the present case "does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Ante, at 17. Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the constitutional protections afforded to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and then declares that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do." Ante, at 13 (emphasis added). Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, ante, at 18; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring," ante, at 6; what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution," ibid.? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry. This case "does not involve" the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so.""" [1]
[0] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/558/#599
[1] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/558/#604
He never said Scalia was perfect. He implied that he was our last hope
So even if that was OPs point, it's wrong.
Merely calling it a "right" is just too hand-wavy, and doesn't convince anyone who doesn't already agree with you.
So I don't know who you're arguing with.
edit: I mean, I deliberately put scare quotes around it.
"I know what I am doing, and you don't." (It has to be interpreted as I did not write it in a literal form, but it will do at least for now.)
Plus: one has the right not to be unnerved by peeking intruders. I have a viz for it, let me search for it and I will update the post.
People have claimed "natural law" to marginalize most of what are now protected classes of people.
The rest of your comment is so incoherent I can't understand what you are trying to say.
I'll translate up to some point.
I wrote that explaining the logic that shows that "privacy is a natural right" is not difficult: it is based at least on the principle that the individual is responsible on his self, and is endowed with a judgement to carry on that responsibility, and that the judgement of his peers is not qualifiable as worthy in such an amount to override that of the responsibility bearer, so, exceptions aside relevant to the impact on others, the peers will leave the individual "in peace" and in suspension of judgement. This produces (logically) one side of the inappropriateness of having peering eyes on you: the peers do not have the qualifications to intrude.
In [that] short [form]: "I know what I am doing [much more than you can in general judge], and you don't". Very loose form, but can be used provisionally as a shortening.
And another side is that shown in the picture, with that Jeremy Clarkson acting as the "annoying staring child": it's annoying to have peering eyes on you - it is more distracting than mosquitoes and one has the right to carry on one's business in peace.
There may be even more sides.
The argument is:
> the individual is responsible on his self, and is endowed with a judgement to carry on that responsibility, and that the judgement of his peers is not qualifiable as worthy in such an amount to override that of the responsibility bearer, so, exceptions aside relevant to the impact on others, the peers will leave the individual "in peace" and in suspension of judgement. This produces (logically) one side of the inappropriateness of having peering eyes on you: the peers do not have the qualifications to intrude
.../hence/, privacy is a natural right. Because, by nature, you are responsible over yourself (you are that inside you), and the others are not, and their judgement is imperfect. So, what you do is your own business, naturally protected by right against the eyes of others (apart, of course, that behaviour which has consequences on others).
> simple and direct
Only proportionally to simplicity and the actual possibility of making something "direct"... As noted («Principia Mathematica»), "1+1" is not really direct...
> "I don't like someone looking at me so privacy is a 'natural' right"
But that is a secondary argument, and it is actually valid: one has the natural right not to be bothered, not to be disturbed. There has to be real, definite, proportional cause to break that rule.
Have you noticed that no one else tries to write like this and people just generally say what they mean?
Scalia's corruption, and his desire to deny the public the tools to prove it, was the thread keeping us all safe.