If you're literally putting human lives at risk and you think there's a real chance of death, what a petty thing to say, "Oh well they should've just listened! It's a high-stakes game!" Do be clear, this doesn't shift the responsibility but it just reinforces that if you want to just raise a stink—do it however you think best. If you want to communicate effectively, you must play by the laws of human ego. Plain and simple.
People always underestimate the allure of human ego and pride.
exactly
If Engineers don't like Managers-with-no-Engineering-background, then Engineers should try to fill the Manager role from their own ranks.
Otherwise, what else do you expect will happen? Like a lot of things, you won't win if you are not in the race.
Having said that, having an Ex-Engineer as a manager doesn't guarantee anything. You need the right ExEngineer - a person who can manage!
STEM people will naturally succeed at this task immediately, while an average person, like a koala unable to understand a leaf is food unless it's put on a tree, can only answer the logic problem if it's phrased in terms of social rules.
The STEM people's brains tended to develop in a way that intuitively understands logic in a more abstract way, better able to understand reality, not just monkey hierarchies.
So they will be averse to politics because it's boring, frustrating, disingenuous monkey shit flinging. But they're the most qualified, because they're more likely to put truth and fairness above tribal enrichment and games.
If engineers more often made the sacrifice to waste their brainpower dive into that swamp, we'd have colonized space and solved hunger etc. by now. But I can't blame them for not wanting to deal with it.
In the original case, you have the following statement: If even, then red. You also have 4 cards, 3, 8, red brown. So two numbers that relate to the if side and two colors that relate to the then side.
In the second picture, you have the statement: If drinking alcohol, then >=21. You also have 4 chards. 16, 25, soda, beer. So two numbers that correlate to the then side and 2 drinks that correlate to the if side.
But the way they arrange and color code the cards makes people associate the drinks with the colors and the ages with the numbers, which is mixing up the if and then.
Granted, this isn't a problem in the text explanation, but could lead to further confusion by someone trying to create associations between drink alcohol status and color when it is really drink alcohol status and even/odd.
Unrelated to my the rest of my comment, I found that despite having what I would consider a very logical brain, I did have a much simpler time solving the drinking problem than the original one. I reach a satisfactory conclusion in each, but the drinking one felt more natural and intuitive while the original problem included a pause and double checking my logic. I would like to be tested on social rules that aren't part of my current social context to see if that played a roll in this specific instance (the article says there is evidence that the effect persists even when the rules aren't part of the existing culture, but that is a general trend and may not apply to specific instances).
I knew I was different, but I didn't think I was that different...
But sometimes there is no solution other than recognizing that it will take longer.
Or at least not with the current team.
And yes, that means telling everyone involved up to and including the CEO if necessary. The only other "solution" was clearly to quit, which they did.
A $60M project with 200 people on it isn't going to be able to pivot to creating that photo-sharing app (or whatever) 12 months faster. It's unethical of the entire management team to not immediately go to the client and tell them that the project is seriously behind expectations, in fact, "career limiting move" or not.
This is why outsourcing gets such a bad name. It's frequently run by unethical scammers who are just there to milk money out of clients.
Deliver nicer and more palatable results and you could have had your own team!
Jeez, reading the comments here makes a lot of the dysfunction I've observed in industry make sense.
The challenger blew up because the engineer in the room kept vetoing due to the cold temperatures and he was pressured to stop vetoing, which he did.
Feynmans point about the safety factor was a side-point about the general attitude that allowed them to feel safe to put politics in front of nature.
This is WHY he made his infamous quote.
> For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled
The safety factor is what they were claiming to the public and what they used to convince a teacher it was safe, but has absolutely nothing to do with why the challenger disaster happened.
In the article, risk was known. "It would be career limiting." The managers knew the risk was to themselves because they weren't offering up a solution.
The Challenger was different. There wasn't hard data that characterized the risk. That was the main problem; there was an absence of known risk because the operational parameters were outside the testing scope. It was more like "We don't know what the risk is, if there is one." That's a very different animal because you're dealing with uncertainty and low probability events. Those risks tend to show up in hindsight. (same with Columbia for that matter).
I commented on this the other day; there's a useful NPR article on the subject.
> The night before the launch, Ebeling and four other engineers at NASA contractor Morton Thiokol had tried to stop the launch. Their managers and NASA overruled them.
> That night, he told his wife, Darlene, "It's going to blow up."
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33488205
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/28/464744781...
He didn’t feel right about it, but that’s not the same as hard data. They didn’t actually have data on the performance of the material at those temperatures, which is part of the big discussion with his managers. He essentially said, “we don’t know how it will act in those conditions.”
Granted, on a safety critical system, having no data should be a scenario very, very carefully considered as a harbinger of doubt, but having no data isn’t the same as having a concrete understanding of the risk. The problem with large, complex systems is you will always find someone who thinks management isn’t taking a certain risk seriously. I know aerospace engineers who don’t want to fly because they feel they know the risk intimately, yet that’s a 5 sigma industry.
Columbia was similar. They had lots of data points that the foam shedding wasn’t a problem is different scenarios, but they didn’t have the same evidence about that specific scenario (the deltaV, flight profile, and where it struck).
If the threshold for risk/doubt is zero, they would never launch. It’s hard to build an engineering consensus without data
Sometimes one side is right, and the other side is wrong, and it doesn't matter if they didn't "communicate and strategize" or "read the room".
Obviously this guy is probably writing about a Javascript photo-sharing app or something and it doesn't actually matter, but it's the same principle. The managers who went ahead here would have gone ahead with launching the shuttle for the same reason.