Perhaps - but one engineer with a niggle is a problem, and a room full of them is absolutely a justificantion for re-evaluation.
They also had a room full of engineers who wanted to go ahead with the launch.
If the threshold for risk/doubt is zero, they would never launch. It’s hard to build an engineering consensus without data
He didn’t feel right about it, but that’s not the same as hard data. They didn’t actually have data on the performance of the material at those temperatures, which is part of the big discussion with his managers. He essentially said, “we don’t know how it will act in those conditions.”
Granted, on a safety critical system, having no data should be a scenario very, very carefully considered as a harbinger of doubt, but having no data isn’t the same as having a concrete understanding of the risk. The problem with large, complex systems is you will always find someone who thinks management isn’t taking a certain risk seriously. I know aerospace engineers who don’t want to fly because they feel they know the risk intimately, yet that’s a 5 sigma industry.
Columbia was similar. They had lots of data points that the foam shedding wasn’t a problem is different scenarios, but they didn’t have the same evidence about that specific scenario (the deltaV, flight profile, and where it struck).