The concern because of this is reasonable: identification would allow voter coercion or vote buying. But I think there are two issues with this concern. The first is that our current system doesn't prevent this. Bringing recording equipment into voting booths is not allowed, but in practice has 0 enforcement or enforceability since many (most?) locations offer shielded voting booths that even include privacy curtains.

The other practical issue with this concern is that buying or coercion would need to be of substantial scale, centralized, advertised, involved traceable transactions, and so on. And this is a criminal felony so the consequences for a leak are substantial. Ultimately, it just does not seem like a realistic attack vector.

So in many ways, I would consider this a feature more than a bug. You can personally verify that your ballot did indeed get counted (at least if you're willing to dig through thousands of ballots looking for your 'secret code') without allowing anybody else to see how you voted.

The current system does make this expensive. Making the ballots public will effectively make the votes public once some student posts a model on github.

To be clear, you do mean makes the voters public right? Because the whole idea of this suggestion is precisely to make the votes public. And I do agree that, within hours, there would be models developed to effectively parse the ballots and help detect any discrepancy - something the current centralized operators just can't seem to manage.

The problem is if the people casting the ballots can be identified by third parties. And in this regard, I don't understand what you mean or if that is what you are even talking about.

People casting ballots will be identified by anyone with an AWS account, yes. The location of the vote and the handwritten checkmark are likely enough to identify the voter.

Give people a ticket and a hole punch. Most polling places are schools so I'm sure we can come up with enough hole punches.