What is annoying is making it the only option, or almost as bad, a mandatory recovery option bypassing all other factors.
What’s the alternative, if you don’t want people to get completely locked out when they fuck up?
If you use a password manager to generate a high-entropy password, come up with similarly-secure answers to the “security questions”, and make sure your email is also secure, then SMS 2FA is a significant downgrade to your overall security.
Explaining 2fa via SMS to that age group is hard enough. Adding authenticators or QR codes into the mix would blow their frail minds.
Today millions of people are using PSD2 compliant SCA (that should not rely on SMS tokens only) in Europe. Usually implemented by a push notifications that you need to approve using biometrics on your smartphone.
“What technology you grew up with” is definitely a factor (not the only factor, but a big one) in “what technology you feel comfortable using”.
2. Actual physical keys are expensive. The margins on many types of depository accounts are razor thin, and giving everyone a physical key would be significant.
3. So an option to #2 is then to use the physical key built into nearly all smartphones these days. But I can definitely say that, at present, that option still doesn't work that great. Have had loads of problems using a phone key with Google's Advanced Protection, many times bugs on Google's part. Also, this normally depends on bluetooth, which can have a ton of connection issues.
I use my tablet and laptop way more than my phone. I hate having to walk to another room to pickup my phone from its charger just to get one of these SMS codes. When I'm doing phone support I often hear, "hold on, I have to get my phone" when this step is required.
You describe using the same device as second factor as the device you use to log in. What's the security benefit in this case compared to a password manager with a strong stored password alone?
See e.g. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/03/16-at..., https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/thiev..., https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/08/congr...
If I have SMS, I then get a message on my phone which I have to enter
Thus something hijacking my machine can't log on silently, even if it pulls the password out of my password manager
I sometimes travel to Iran to visit relatives. For obvious reasons, there are no roaming deals between US carriers and Iranian carriers, so I am unable to receive SMS messages while there. I’ve been bitten several times by websites that see I’m logging in from a scary IP address, and force me to authenticate via 2FA SMS to proceed. Whoops, guess I can’t check my bank account for a month now!
Nothing, except the reason companies use SMS 2FA is the vast majority of people still don't use a password manager with a unique strong stored password.
(SMS 2FA + Strong Password) is worse than (SMS 2FA + Weak Password).
SMS 2FA doesn't solve phishing and it muddies your identity with a weak, transferable identifier. If you've taken the time to set up SMS 2FA for yourself you could have just used a strong password, especially since password manages are now built into browsers.
At least with TOTP you aren't adding additional vulnerabilities, but frankly most 2FA is pointless unless it's FIDO2, assuming you just use a password manager and use strong passwords.
Having to scan a QR code is too much friction compared to just asking for their phone number which will then send a code that a modern phone OS will then be able to autofill all without leaving the app and going into the messages app to retrieve that code.
Edit: I have 4 YubiKeys and a Ledger Nano S that I use for critical services, such as my Google accounts and domain registrar, and I _still_ use SMS 2FA out of laziness for most services.