The fundamental issue is that you can't have one without the other, and that's bothering me. It's not like only corporate grade laptops come with TPMs now (like they did in the past).
Safetynet on my phone is the same thing and it's very much "about my own private machine". Seeing the reactions and the lack thereof about these developments makes me think this will end terribly.
AFAIK, secure boot can be disabled, both in the BIOS and in the Kernel.
In some machines that's not be the case due to contracts with Microsoft, but those already can't run Linux in the first place, so you probably won't buy them for the purpose of running Linux.
The suggestions in the original post do not change anything about this.
I want to be able to access all services with whatever client I please. Not be required to run approved software and hardware that puts them in control.
So.... vote with your feet and choose a bank that shares your values more closely?
That never worked and will not work now. You can't choose something that's not being offered.
Why do you think you're entitled to something that's not being offered?
I think there's a general point here about how retail banking is not really an ideal free market, because the barrier to entry is too high. If no bank is providing a set of services that fit the compromises you want to make, then either your problem is with the government (who arguably over-regulate the space) or not enough people share your values to warrant creating a banking business around it.
> Well, sort of; a service agreement is a relationship, and TPM/remote attestation is a huge overreach by the corporate party. It's only fair to want to push back on what's becoming an abusive relationship.
On the flip side, the bank has to manage a complicated series of risks, and their investors might not want to pay the mitigation costs of the risks created by allowing anyone to use their service however they like. Hence the ToS.
It's not that I feel entitled, and more that I'm required to use a bank to not starve, or at least to participate in the modern society. I'm not in this relationship by choice, I'm forced into it at metaphorical gunpoint by the economy.
And, it still means the advice to "vote with your feet" is invalid. I have no one to vote for.
> there's a general point here about how retail banking is not really an ideal free market, because the barrier to entry is too high.
There's an even more general point here, that this applies to pretty much every good and service. Not just banking, not just phones, not just computing. It applies to cars and clothes and food and housing just as well. Hence me saying that voting with your feet/wallet doesn't work in general. Mature markets end up supply-driven - vendors collectively decide what choices are available; the only way to have a vote is to become a vendor yourself, which is a long, hard and risky process.
> On the flip side, the bank has to manage a complicated series of risks, and their investors might not want to pay the mitigation costs of the risks created by allowing anyone to use their service however they like. Hence the ToS.
Sure. There are conflicting interests here. But the right answer isn't one party dictating how the entire relationship works. That's abuse.
At my last job, it was impossible to be paid except by direct deposit into a bank account. At certain times during the past couple years, it was impossible to go into my bank to do any transacting. I feel like I should be able to have a job without needing a smart phone and an app.
They are not obliged by law in any way. However leading up to this point, whatever happens on my side of the network socket has been my discretion. Disrupting this dynamic just bothers me.
For now.
I wrote about this nearly a decade ago:
https://www.theregister.com/2013/11/14/microsoft_surface_rt_...
AFAIK, rather than make the firmware unlockable, MS sent vast amounts of inventory to landfill.
Not wishing to pick on you personally, but the above paragraph is wonderful example of the sort of logic going around that bothers me.
You trace a faultless journey from responsibility to desiring total control.
That's not what responsibility is.
You're describing the feeling of culpability within a brutal regime - where Vader simply force-chokes a lieutenant for "failing me once too often".
Responsibility involves leadership, which involves not stripping every subordinate of their agency, dignity and humanity. It involves trusting people. Sadly, computers make a "zero trust" ecosystem far too easy now, and that's how they can destroy our society. Good computing is figuring out ways to preserve liberal democratic society while also improving it.
It’s not that you can’t trust your employees. It’s that you can’t trust them to defend themselves from being mugged.
The forcing function for all this removal of freedom is defense against malicious hackers. The removal of freedom is not the goal so much as a side effect.
It works the same way in the real world. We would not need borders or armies or police if everyone were nice.
> The problem isn’t that you can’t trust people.
Good. It's always best to have an optimistic view of our fellows, that's how we build good social structures.
> The problem is that people are defenceless in the face of malicious hackers
So. Make then not defenceless. We arm them. With education and other tools they need to defend themselves. Digital Self Defence (Or Digital Literacy 2.0 if you want a fluffier title) is the project I am committed to. Defensive tools belong in the hands of users.
> with vastly more expertise
We can balance the theatre twofold, by giving people more defensive capability, knowledge and rights, and by attacking the knowledge base and knowledge value of malicious actors. We must recognise that many of our own institutions play part of the problem, from vendor malware, and backdoors to security disinformation. Cyber-law needs radical reform to give end-user better security rights, and "surveillance capitalism" needs dragging to the dock.
> zero day vulnerabilities.
Starting maybe with an all out assault on "zero days", including the companies, agencies and re-sellers of them, using the law.
> It’s that you can’t trust them to defend themselves from being mugged.
Part of ones job then, is to enable them to defend themselves. You cannot follow your children around for the rest of their lives in case bullies pick on them. You need to teach them fighting skills so they won't be doormats. That's the reality of the digital workplace today. Also, don't give your kids gold Rolex Oyster watches and diamond rings to mooch around scuzzy neighbourhoods with. Limit assets, practice compartmentalisation. Half an ounce of sensible opsec is worth a ton of authoritarian technical non-solutions.
> The removal of freedom is not the goal so much as a side effect.
The removal of freedom is NEVER an acceptable "side effect" of any security action. Security and freedom are not diamtrics. Otherwise "the terrorists win" and one may as well join the ranks of malicious principles and directly attack our own people (which is the stance many US agencies have taken since 2001 toward baby and bath-water alike)
> real world ... borders armies police
But this isn't the real world. Its a digital one which is different. The old military model of perimeters and weapons isn't working and smart people in cybersecurity know that. The collateral damage of that broken model is our digital economy and liberal democracy itself (which are intimately linked in the American/Western mind if you believe one jot in things like startups and entrepreneurialism).
We'll simply have to do better than letting criminal gangs like Microsoft and Google become unelected guardians of our social fabric. We still have laws, schools and hopefully enough common sense to avoid that.
This, simply put, doesn't work in an enterprise context. I'd argue that relying on people for security doesn't work in any context, and that it's about as effective as relying on programmers to not code memory leaks, but in companies where there's people whose _only_ use of a desktop computer is at work, as is increasingly common nowadays, it's simply not possible to get half the people out there to learn more than absolutely required to do their job. Go look at /r/sysadmin or /r/talesfromtechsupport: for some people it's a critical emergency if their desktop icons are rearranged because then their muscle memory to click on Chrome is broken. And that's not to mention executives who believe they're above things like "phishing awareness campaigns". Technical measures are much cheaper and vastly more effective than social measures directed at people who don't want to learn
Perhaps the hopeless people you describe are the product of a hopeless context - the "enterprise context" you mention. That culture seems to encourage intellectual sloth and shrugging ambivalence, and you give good examples.
> Go look at /r/sysadmin or /r/
Please, I'd rather not :)
> executives who believe they're above things like "phishing awareness campaigns
My goodness I've met them. They're basically paid too much. I had to make a humint/influence piece for a major bank in London. Cybersec referred to it as "the cock problem"; basically mostly male with high six figure salaries whose security weakness was they "don't give a fuck". Same kind of fellas who would get pissed-up and drive their Aston Martin DB into a children's play-park. Major liability. They've learned they can transgress with impunity and just use money to solve it. What do they care if other people's money gets hacked? Not the best model for business, which requires a more upright mind-set to excel at. But banks don't exactly need to compete in a real business world.
> Technical measures are much cheaper and vastly more effective
Only in the short term. You'll need to forever keep your technical measures one step ahead of the mixture of malice and idiocy out there. A changed culture replicates and even grows itself.
But ultimately, while I always wanted people to take training courses in computer use, I still implemented security measures, because I knew that people were at the company to work, not to take training courses. I want security measures in place for the same reason I want computers in the first place: so that I can let the computer worry about it for me. I don't want to have phishing awareness campaigns when I can just make the spam filter more effective. I don't want to tech people not to click the flashing greed download button when I can just roll out an ad blocker across the entire organization. I don't want to send an emergency email blast to my coworkers telling them not to download TOTALLY_NOT_A_VIRUS.PDF.EXE from the chain email going around and keep one step ahead of the mixture of malice and idiocy out there when I can just set up a system to scan email attachments for viruses in the first place. Yes, I want a more informed and educated workplace, and I worked to make that happen, but I want computers to work for me and do the hard part for me as well
What we need to do with Digital Self Defence is raise awareness of civic cyber-security needs from school ages 5 upwards (My government in the UK have started on this project). We also need to screen for digital literacy.
The goal to teach people how technology works is admirable and necessary, but it is no defence against a motivated attacker. The attackers will always have a massive information advantage just because they have so much more time to aquire it.
This (especially) includes the machine's firmware and kernel because that's where malware could effectively hide itself from countermeasures deployed on the machines directly.
If I can then also make sure that the various admin interfaces in our network can only be used by machines in a known-good state, I would sleep ever so much better knowing that the various hacks we have seen happening to 1Password, Uber, etc this year cannot happen on my network.
I would even say that this is helpful for my users because they will never risk being "the one who let the ransomware in".
This isn't about your own private machine. This is about corporation-owned machines in an enterprise network and as we see with nearly biweekly news articles about large-scale ransomware attacks, private data leaks and compromised employee machines, I would argue that the currently employed solutions clearly don't work.