This 1996 757 Aeroperu crash recording is quite scary: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5QSBlYTJ1Y
They had no functioning pitot tubes and lots of contradictory indications, which triggered a storm of alarms, most of them false. Pilots spend quite some time trying to shut alarms off while trying to figure out their situation with air control. I can't imagine trying to talk and cooperate with colleagues, facing a complex system and a life-or-death situation, while so many loud and stressful sounds are buzzing through my ears.
After 9:00, the plane inverts upside down, a "whoop-whoop" alarm goes off and the plane finally crashes into the sea. The alarm only served the sinister purpose of announcing they were going to die.
There's actually a tendency to reduce
the number of different alarms and
use screen information to indicate the problem
Yes, that'd be good UX. There should be only one actionable task presented at any time to correct errors. In any case, user testing is more important than guidelines.I wonder if grouped alarms make any sense. For instance you can group all alarms related to stalling together, and present the one thing the pilot can do to correct this. This gives the pilot a sense of what is the most effective use of their attention in a bad situation.
QF mishap - the Wikipedia article didn't talk about the alarms.
In the AF447 case, the crew was getting the stall warning. They did the exact opposite of what you are supposed to do to recover from the stall. Computers were not the problem. (The same thing happened to that Colgan Air flight a few years ago. The crew reacted to the stall warning by stalling the plane even more. The plane tried to physically force the controls to nose down, which is how you recover from a stall, but the pilots fought it. Bad UI was not the problem. Bad flying was.)
It seems counter intuitive to nose down when you're falling out of the sky, but it's how you recover.
If one were to apply principles of Tao, it would be to yield. Give the stick pusher nothing to push.
The plane tried to physically force the
controls to nose down,
I'm glad you mentioned that. I thought that's what a plane should do at first, and then on second consideration wondered if the psychology of panicking pilots would be to fight the controls in order to wrest the plane from going down.Given that user interfaces on airplanes are digital now, there are a lot of opportunities to innovate.
For instance, where there are multiple failures and alarms, it might be better for the panel to continuously replay the sequence in which the alarms were set off, more or less like how movies do it to help the viewer understand what is happening on the computer. By showing how a system is failing through time, it shows a causal relationship. In addition, you can provide drill down capabilities.
In the case of Air France, perhaps it could have illustrated the AoA through time, and the flight velocity. Perhaps that would have explained something to the pilot.
There are lots of messages because lots of things can go wrong with an aircraft. They aren't all critical "land now" messages, but may be relevant.
Angle of attack sensor. AoA is the actual definition of a stall as it measures the point at which airflow breaks away from the wing, reducing lift.
Re your other points on computer warnings, cockpits can get pretty noisy when shit happens with various alarms, buzzers, horns and voices going off. There's actually a tendency to reduce the number of different alarms and use screen information to indicate the problem (although that may be changing after the Qantas drama in 2010 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32).