Old school one when I was a security consultant for a bit (pre-automated pentest scammers). Medium size regulated fintech. Domain admin passwords and admin accounts were stuck on post it notes on a board in the machine room. If you went over the road to the college, asked to use the toilet, which they seemed fine with, and poked your 200mm lens out of the bathroom window you could snap them all.
Don't assume that level of competence improved with addition of technology.
Did some consulting for an org that did managed IT and found that they wrote on a white board all of their passwords. Wrote them an email basically telling them "hey maybe you should erase that". May or may not have billed them for the time it took to write that email.
They put a piece of paper over the passwords in response.
At least, until you have a network-attached webcam pointed at your whiteboard.
But the solution to the webcam problem is to write its access credentials on your whiteboard, thus forming a circular and perfectly secure loop.
Also, I no-joke heard of a company that absolutely, unironically, did the webcam thing with RSA tokens.
I've seen it done hundreds of times...
What do you use?
My current manager is delightfully paranoid about security, so maybe I'll do it again to see if he says anything.
Yet another reason we need to adopt standards like security.txt and make it easy to report these things as it is to tell robots to ignore us with robots.txt. See securitytxt.org for more on the project.
That and also security is just hard to scale. That's why if it was mandated by legislation, companies would be forced to spend a comparable amount on scaling their security teams and efforts.
We get a lot of things that boil down to "When I go to your website, I am able to see the content of your html files!" ... yes, reporter. That is what a web server does. It gives you HTML files. Congrats that you have figure out the dev console on your browser, but you're not a hacker. I'm trying to go with Hanlon's razor here and assume this is inexperienced people and not outright scams.
We don't get a lot of these, but they far outweigh actual credible reports. But we try our best and take everything seriously until it can get disproven. And it's exhausting. So I get it sometimes. Sometimes having a place for responsible disclosure just opens yourself up to doing more paperwork (verifying that the fake reports are fake). That said, we still do it.
100% this. And it bites harder when you’re a scrappy time constrained startup, or just offering a public service.
I maintain a public API that returns public information- observable facts about the world. As such, the API doesn’t have any authn/z. Anyone can use it as little or as much as they want, free of charge.
Of course I get at least 1 email per year telling me my API is insecure and that I should really set up some OAuth JWT tokens and blah blah blah.
I used to reply telling them they are wrong but it gets hostile because they want money for finding the “vulnerability”.
On the flip side, at another company I once got a security@ email that sounded like a false alarm. I quickly wrote it off and sent a templates response. Then they came back with screenshots of things that shocked me. It was not a false alarm. That guy got paid a handsome sum and an apology from me for writing him off.
It's possible "security isn't a concern" because they are dismissing the report, not the security.
A friend once told me he was having a hard time getting a client to take his security concerns seriously. So I went on github and found a commit in their repo that included a production password and sent it to him. Maybe took 5-10 minutes to find? Apparently once they found out about the commit, they panicked a bit and started taking his concerns more seriously.