Analytic (Anglo/UK philosophy) philosophy tries to solve this by being extremely clear about everything to the point of looking like a math paper. This turned out to not work because math can't do that, but it still means there's a lot of specific -isms.
Continental (French/German) philosophy seems to just lean into it and can be nearly unreadable; some of this is translation issues, some people say this is because their points are so deep they can't be expressed in clear language, and some people say this is because French people don't respect philosophers unless they don't understand what they're talking about.
As for what you can do about this - well, maybe you could just ask them what they meant?
I'd argue that it is because among people talking about "artificial general intelligence" there is a rough consensus about what "intelligence" means in this context (generally, according to Legg&Hutter 2007, which is a long discussion but the essence is captured by "Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments") and it's counterproductive to explicitly define it in detail (which is very tricky) unless the argument hinges on some nuance of the definition, which it almost never does.
In essence, the GAI arguments are unchanged for a whole 'family of definitions' so an attempt to push the debate towards "define intelligence" is just derailing the discussion by provoking to repeat a discussion that's essentially settled 15 years ago. In any GAI-related discussion I can reasonably presume that we have a shared understanding of what we're talking about, there isn't much debate about the terms within the field - and if it seems that someone not from the field is applying a wildly different definition of intelligence (i.e. taking the colloquial understanding or some definition that explicitly refers to humans or one that adds in specific goals as opposed to being good at achieving whatever goals the agent has) then it can be pointed out that no, that's not what we're talking about, but within the field the terminology is clear enough, and also as soon as you're talking about detail, you aren't talking about "intelligence in general" but rather about capabilities for specific kinds of decisonmaking or performance on specific tasks; and if a philosopher says "well, that isn't true intelligence" then I can fully concede it, but just state that for the discussion of AI it doesn't matter if it's "true intelligence" but this is what we're talking about as those properties are considered to be sufficient for the described capabilities and consequences.
If you're not careful about it though, people tend to slide into using specific definitions of "intelligence" like "calculation ability", implying it'll increase linearly as you add more GPUs to your data center. And you end up with assumptions that they'll necessarily be cold, calculating and perfect like a computer, but boredom could be a necessary property of a general intelligence, otherwise it'd get stuck on problems.
Or not. If not, maybe humans aren't generally intelligent.
The way I see it, as soon as you think about it seriously it becomes obvious that all (or at least most) the negative feelings we have are there for a very good practical reason. Boredom is effectively a push to prevent an agent from being stuck in a local optimum, and required to get a more effective explore-vs-exploit tradeoff (for whom we have theoretical grounding for what's good or not based on the analysis of "multi-armed-bandit" problems), and the same applies for satiating pleasure e.g. hedonic treadmill; burnout is required for an agent to be able to "say" "this isn't working, you need to do literally anything else"; fear has obvious benefits for risk management; and anger, hate and vengeance has obvious causes in game theory about optimal strategies in games with potential defectors.
So that is an argument that any effective general intelligence is likely to possess at least some of the emotions that we recognize, simply because they are effective for a purpose.
On the other hand, these factors are (or were) required for a specific environment, namely evolution in a social community of peers - so perhaps an agent can be scarily effective without them, especially if their environment is very different.
Considering much of continental philosophy is a response to Kant and/or Hegel, I don't know how you're able to convince yourself of this rather reductionist take on the history of that conversation (because this isn't even close to fair) unless you've never read Kant or Hegel, and don't understand why it would follow that the way one writes is implicated by the conclusions of Kant/Hegel.
This goes as far back as Nietzsche, who never stops talking about why form/content divide is completely misleading and a historical artifact itself, some examples off the top of my head, paraphrased, like "The Greeks thought Socrates was refuted by his ugliness"; "Spinoza purposely writes in a style to make you think his argument is mathematically irrefutable, as if it were dipped in bronze", "naming things is the first form of political power", etc, etc. This theme carries threw from his first book to his last.
There's more to this story when you get to the likes of Heiddeger, Derrida, Foucault, etc so I'm condensing for brevity, but its just strange to me that you approach continental philosophy as some arbitrary veering off course when there's a well-vetted history as to why it takes such form over time. You're not actually making some argument from first principles (the conduction of philosophical discourse looks like this...") nor are you demonstrating an exhaustive accounting of European philosophy, you're merely demonstrating you've already made a certain philosophical commitment, and that's that.
Conversely (per gp), analytic tries too hard to be clear and precise, at the expense of possibly missing some difficult to express subtleties (or, perhaps continentals might say, missing the point entirely).
But it's no surprise that continental is always gonna get trashed when people who aren't pre-committed to the canon want to discuss philosophical topics. And I agree with the takes that say (as I understand gp to be implying) that philosophy needs other styles to be accessible and to effectively cross-pollinate with other disciplines.
I understand the modern analytics now consider their own approach to have not worked that well and been more of a writing style than a field of study, but that may just be the ones I know. (http://sootyempiric.blogspot.com/2021/05/the-end-of-analytic...)
I don't think I know any authentic continentals to know what they think about themselves; in America you tend to just run into people who've misread them (political activists who go around calling everything "social constructs").
It seems to me quite odd that moral philosophy seems always to get so bogged down in lingo. You'd think the study of "how to be good" should be something that values directness and accessibility. What is the point of a moral philosophy that only a couple academics can follow?