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Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @11:13AM (#33132972)
How could the user verify that the endpoint never learns anything about the user's identity, and that the system never learns anything about the requesting endpoint? In situations where privacy is particularly sensitive, either or both could have a motive to learn more about the user.
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @11:17AM (#33133010)
I have seen it explained before, believe it was done using a combination of combination of differential privacy and zero knowledge proofs, but might wrong. Currently trying to find a detailed explanation of how to implement such a system using existing technology. In mean time, if anyone else is aware of such a system, please post a link.

EDIT: This appears to cover some aspects, still reviewing it and to confirm it covers all the system attributes I described:

https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/96232/zkp-prove-t...

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @11:40AM (#33133215)
Hmm, I don't think that protocol as described would be sufficient for the government. What would prevent Alice (age 18) from sharing her signed age statement with her friend Charlie (age 17), who passes it to Bob to falsify his age? The government would not want underage users to collude with 18+ users to gain access to age-gated endpoints.
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @11:50AM (#33133298)
Agree, still trying to find full explanation, seen it described before. Aside from sharing the token, other issue is if the endpoint cached the token, it’s unique and could be cross-referenced to deanonymize the user if 3rd-party or government gained access to list of tokens an endpoint collected.

Obviously looking for example, but if you’re able to think of an additional issues that need to be accounted for, let me know.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by IX-103 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @12:39PM (#33133758)
Unless it's a blinded token. In which case the endpoint cannot match the token that was issued to the token that was spent. They can only verify that the token is valid.

I first saw them used with Clouflare's Privacy Pass https://www.hcaptcha.com/privacy-pass, they've also been used with Google's trust token proposal.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @01:05PM (#33134009)
Thanks, know I have looked at Privacy Pass before, not 100% sure after quick review of the related links if it covers the all system attributes I described; still looking it over.

For those interested, here’s the related paper covering it:

https://www.petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue3/popets...

And yes, my understanding was tokens entered a pool of one-time tokens and neither the government or endpoint was able to cross reference them to a specific user.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @02:01PM (#33134478)
Would these be susceptible to the issuing organization refusing to issue new tokens to some individual?
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @03:58PM (#33135481)
If you load link below and look for “Problem: Malleability” it say, “ It’s possible to create an arbitrary number of pairs of points that will be verified. The client can create these points by multiplying both T and sT by an arbitrary number a. If the client attempts to redeem aT and a(sT), the server will accept it. This effectively gives the client unlimited redemptions.”

Which to me might mean it might address if user is refused new tokens, it might not account for if the tokens are revoked or the authorizing entity ceased to exist, but the attribute was uniform, for example age.

https://privacypass.github.io/protocol/

All and all, at very least, appears to be an extensive and extendable standard, assuming those involved are reasonable and there’s no conflicting interests.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @12:21PM (#33133577)
Yep, that's another thing I was thinking of: if Alice uses the same token all the time for every endpoint, then the endpoints could trivially use that as a unique identifier to track Alice. Perhaps the government could create a service for Alice to create new age tokens whenever she wants.

Even then, if the government actively compelling endpoints to hand over their data is within the threat model, the government could inspect any cached temporary tokens to deanonymize the users. This could perhaps be mitigated with some way for users to irreversibly transform the temporary tokens given by the government, but I'm not sure if that's possible while retaining the ability for endpoints to verify the tokens.

Overall, though, the sharing problem seems to me to be the biggest issue by far with this scheme. What makes a user an individual human? In current implementations, their unique government ID (perhaps made illegal to falsify) is used for this. But I can't see how individual humans can be distinguished in a privacy-preserving way.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @12:38PM (#33133749)
My memory was that the tokens enter a pool of tokens and that neither government or endpoint is unable to trace which user used which token and they’re one-time use tokens, so users is unable to share them. Guess never really gave system much thought at the time, since governments rarely want less data or to provide anonymous access — and average person does not care about anonymous access, in fact, in my experience they want everything logged.
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @02:00PM (#33134469)
Another possible issue, for any scheme that uses government-issued temporary tokens (even blinded tokens) that have an expiration date: the government could stop issuing tokens to a user at any time, preventing them from accessing any gated sites after their current tokens expire.
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @02:56PM (#33134929)
Agree, more to the point, once some attributes are verified, for example age, it shouldn’t require government to reverify. That said, some attributes should require if needed real-time verification, for example if an individual is legally allowed to drive, enter a country, etc.
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @03:29PM (#33135244)
Wouldn't caching verification data require the endpoints to hold user sessions? Thus, if the government withheld verification services for a user, wouldn't it prevent that user from creating new independent sessions on their current endpoints, as well as preventing that user from verifying on new endpoints?
Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @04:00PM (#33135506)
Not 100% sure understand you, but believe this comment might address your question:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33133749

Ideally, endpoints would not even know the specific authentication provider, but that the authentication came from a authentication service that’s authorized to confirm a given identity and related attributes; for example, being over X age is a binary attribute and numerous entities should be able to authenticate that and it be honored by a jurisdiction similar to how passports are uniform.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by rkagerer on Saturday October 08, 2022 @01:24PM (#33134179)
No matter how you design this, at some point it involves trusting a third party who views your ID doesn't leak PII to other parties.

This problem doesn't exist with today's simple prompts that just ask for your birthday and blindly trust the end user.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @02:10PM (#33134547)
Indeed. It seems like most proposals delegate this role to the government, since they already have your basic ID anyway. The question is, how can the website operators interact with the government in such a way that the websites don't learn which government ID you have, and the government doesn't learn which websites you're visiting?

Surprisingly (to me at least), certain cryptographic tricks can do a pretty big chunk of that, by having the website/government and user/government interactions occur ahead of time. But as far as I can see, there's still the issue with these tricks that 18+ people could share their access with under-18 people, which the government would want to prevent.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by O__________O on Saturday October 08, 2022 @02:41PM (#33134803)
I actually do have an economic technical solution to the issue of remote authentication of zero-trust systems that makes sharing a one-time token impossible, but currently not motivated to share it, since it’s possible I might want to use it myself formally; super simple, very possible someone else has already used it before. Realize you have to take my word for it, but to me, that’s non-issue.

Also, does appear Privacy Pass covers the other aspects, which is covered on this page, but still trying to work through if it covers all aspects of a system that at least for myself I would be agreeable to use for things like: age verification, citizenship, captchas, etc — basically anonymous verification of identity attributes.

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by LegionMammal978 on Saturday October 08, 2022 @04:43PM (#33135844)
Huh, I read up on Privacy Pass, and it really does seem to have the properties I'm looking for. Taking the government as the issuer/attester, it seems like the endpoint (origin) gives a challenge to the user (client), the user requests a token from the government (which, critically, the government can verify without knowing the user's ID), and uses this token to respond to the endpoint's challenge. Thus, the government might learn that some user accessed that particular endpoint (depending on the exact setup used), but cannot learn who it was. And since it does not know the user's identity, it cannot censor a particular user, only potentially a particular endpoint.

I also don't really see how present physical identity could be proven in a privacy-preserving manner, if you don't trust the government or endpoints not to abuse that physical data. Alas, even if I take your word for it, I doubt that governments would implement such an indirect system for age verification in practice, especially since they might want to revoke any erroneously-issued tokens.

(And even if anonymous non-circumventable age gating were to become a reality, I still wouldn't be a fan of differential privacy regulations for minors, since many ordinary sites would become inaccessible to teenagers from following the path of least resistance. Either impose the regulations on all users, impose them gradually depending on age, or don't impose them at all.)

Re:Calif. Law to Protect Children's Privacy Could Lead to In... by rkagerer on Thursday October 13, 2022 @11:26AM (#33192324)
which, critically, the government can verify without knowing the user's ID

Wouldn't they know your IP address from which the request is coming? Or potentially use other browser tracking and fingerprinting tricks?

Maybe I misunderstood but it didn't sound like you were describing blind tokens issued in advance.

Thus, the government might learn that some user accessed that particular endpoint

In my view the government knowing the endpoint associated with an individual request is a critical shortcoming. It's just too short a crevasse for them to jump to get that missing piece (identity). Even if the protocol is sound there are other means (eg. force an endpoint to hand over logs, associate with authentications via timing or other characteristics, and use other tracking metadata provided by the endpoint itself or other third parties or even ISP's to figure out who accessed what). No thank you.

Also creates an easy, centralized chokepoint for more widespread censorship. Simply put, the government is not a choice actor I would trust with this type of capability. The technology is not mature enough to truly, in practice, provide the protections needed to do this right.