IMO the more logical guess as to the actual reason Apple wants to do this - to approach e2e encrypted iCloud photos in a LE-friendly way.
And I don’t think anyone was suggesting that Apple would secretly betray users. The concern is normalization of the notion of on-device scanning before (publicly) expanding the scope to all images.
In any case, I think this concern of yours is unfounded, as echoed by many in the other comments below, and you should rethink it before continuing to push it.
The amount of scanning has not changed since the invention of corporate image hosting on the internet; you still cannot use iCloud to host known illegal content - they just moved where the scanning takes place. I don't see how this makes it any more likely or normalized to scan your non-iCloud photos.
Since the photos are decryptable by keys in Apple’s possession, there is no real advantage to scanning on-device unless Apple/the government wanted to increase the scope of the scanning beyond iCloud.
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web
Apple didn’t propose this, and the scheme that Apple did propose was very inconvenient if they actually wanted to do this. They would have had to redesign how the system worked to do it, at which point most of the system would become completely useless. Nobody would come up with a system like Apple’s if they wanted to do what you describe. There are much simpler ways to do that which would have saved Apple a lot of time and effort. The only reason to design a system like Apple’s is to limit knowledge in all directions as much as possible.
Nobody was rightfully concerned about this, they got outraged because they would rather jump to conclusions over headlines than take the time to read about how the scheme worked.
iCloud photos are not e2e encrypted. If only iCloud photos were the true final target, there is absolutely no need for on-device scanning.
This doesn’t make any sense because this system cannot be rolled out to non-iCloud photos. They would have to redesign how it worked. So the whole idea that Apple designed it this way for reasons that only kick in when it’s rolled out to non-iCloud photos is incoherent. If Apple were designing it for that purpose they would have picked a design that actually worked in those circumstances.
A known CSAM photo gets added to photos on an iPhone with iCloud disabled – what happens next? What do you think is the mechanism for that getting reported?