Re:Deviations from Chromium (features we disable or remove)
by dannyobrien on Tuesday September 06, 2022 @02:47PM
(#32741421)
There were some privacy concerns, regarding leaking of user information: https://github.com/WICG/scroll-to-text-fragment/issues/76
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:Deviations from Chromium (features we disable or remove)
by illiac786 on Wednesday September 07, 2022 @10:48PM
(#32760506)
I read this and I am surprised the link fragment is sent to the DNS server, that is not how I understood DNS worked.
Why isn't only the FQDN sent?
Re:Deviations from Chromium (features we disable or remove)
by password4321 on Thursday September 08, 2022 @03:25PM
(#32770740)
It's not the link fragment portion of the URL in the address bar that is sent to DNS, it is DNS requests from additional lazily-loaded content that is pulled up when the browser jumps down to it.
Someone else went into detail: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32742504
Re:Deviations from Chromium (features we disable or remove)
by illiac786 on Friday September 09, 2022 @01:42AM
(#32775704)
This requires the attacker to have third party content on the page you are trying to get the user to scroll through, that is a huge assumption no?
The password web page example is here highly unlikely: if the attacker injected his external content on the password web page, he has already a very strong position - getting users to click on links is not a logical next step, the attacker has far better avenues I would assume.
At least that's my understanding.