Nope. Sorry but that's not how it works.
If the landlord has to pay 4x tax they will pass some (all) of that increase to the renter. Also, a 4x increase in tax != 4x increase in rent.
So, say the property is worth 1mil$, and you pay 1% tax. That's 10k. You charge 3k rent. The taxman makes the tax 4%, now you have to pay 40k. You decide to pass 30k to the renter. So now they pay 36k+30k rent per year. 4x tax, 2x rent.
If a landlord does this, sure. Renters find a new place. No brainer. If all landlords do this, the renters arr fucked. Finding a new place will not save you. In effect you make it way worse on the renters.
The solution to the housing crisis is not some trick involving taxes, rent caps, adding more rules etc. The solution is simple: build more housing. That's the only thing that will work and will bring down the pressure.
We also need to stop conflating affordable housing with home ownership. If you are having trouble finding a place to rent you can afford there is no way you can buy a house. I feel like the HN bubble w/ our high sky salaries is somewhat disconnected from what the average person can actually do.
How much of a tax gets passed along to the consumer is modeled in an introductory macroeconomics course. It depends upon the elasticity of supply and demand. A tax falls primarily on the side of the transaction with the lower elasticity, because they are less able to adapt behavior to avoid the tax.
https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/microec...
The reason economists like a land-value tax is because the elasticity of supply for land is effectively zero: there is a fixed amount of land, and regardless of what the tax rate is, landowners are either going to seek a return on their ownership or will sell it to someone else who'll get a better return. Elasticity of demand is pretty low too, but it's not zero: people can double up with roommates, move in with families, or become homeowners. So a tax on unimproved land ends up falling almost entirely on the landlord, with relatively little long-term impact on rents.
In practice, we're likely to see pretty severe reallocations of land and short-term price dislocations, as existing landowners find that their usage is not productive enough to pay the tax and so they need to sell to new firms who will use the land in different ways. But this is working-as-intended: the goal of an LVT is to incentivize better usage of land through high-density development of desirable parcels, individual homeownership (when density makes sense), and commercial activity.
There are at least two problems with your logic: if you take all the land you can make the claim about the elasticity of supply, but not all land is created equal. Location, infrastructure, usage all factor into this. Taking the example of unimproved land. If I buy a piece of the said land near a town and don't use it for anything I just pay the tax on it and effectively lose money, right? What if the city builds infra near my land that makes it effective now to develop? Should I pay more tax now? It's still unimproved. Should I pay more tax in case of a rezoning if I could potentially build a house but I don't? See how I actually created one class of land by substracting from another!
If I can buy and afford (ie have the capital) to hold land for the long term + I can see where new developments are going to take I will be incentivized to hoard land. I can also make the case that it's undeveloped and I should pay less tax.
Now there is land that just sits there when it could be used for farming. Now we are having food and housing shortages.
To answer all your questions:
"If I buy a piece of the said land near a town and don't use it for anything I just pay the tax on it and effectively lose money, right?"
Yup. Don't do that.
"What if the city builds infra near my land that makes it effective now to develop? Should I pay more tax now?"
Yes, you should.
This is actually one of the biggest arguments for a LVT, and it has three angles. The first is moral - it's society that's building the schools/parks/transit/infra that made the land value go up, so it should be society that reaps the benefits. After all, the property owner didn't pay to build that subway stop, they just got lucky and got to free-ride off of public benefits. It makes sense that the returns for building public infrastructure go back to the public in the form of additional tax revenue, which they can use to fund maintenance and new infrastructure.
The second is the economic flip-side of this: an LVT provides an incentive to right-size the government. Without this economic feedback loop, there's no check on public-sector spending tax revenues in inefficient ways. Who cares whether a new transit stop benefits residents vs. provides a boondoggle to contractors, if the benefits to residents are all captured by landlords rather than either the residents or the government? But if further public funding is contingent upon raising rents and hence tax revenues within the city, the incentive is to spend money in ways that will actually make the city more desirable and justify those higher rents.
The third economic argument is on individual landlords and developers. An LVT discourages speculation - if you're sitting on that unimproved lot and not getting any revenue from it, you're still paying taxes and will eventually go broke. Your incentive is to sell it to a developer who will build more housing on it, so that more people can enjoy the public amenities that made the land valuable in the first place. Leading into your next question:
"Should I pay more tax in case of a rezoning if I could potentially build a house but I don't?"
Yes. That's how you ensure that land is fully utilized and people who need housing can get it.
"If I can buy and afford (ie have the capital) to hold land for the long term + I can see where new developments are going to take I will be incentivized to hoard land."
It's the opposite way around - you're disincentivized from hoarding land, because you have to pay taxes on the land that's not cash-flowing. You're incentivized to sell to the people who are actually going to build and buy those new developments.
"I can also make the case that it's undeveloped and I should pay less tax."
You can also make the case that the government should just give you money, but in both that and your example, you'd be wrong. Everybody pays the same land tax, based on the unimproved value of the land. A developer who built an 80-unit apartment complex on 2 acres might pay $200K/year; a speculator who sits on 2 acres of undeveloped land also pays $200K/year. The difference is that the developer might be pulling in $2M/year and making a profit of $1.8M/year, while the speculator is slowly going broke. That and the developer is providing housing for 80 families while the speculator is doing nothing useful.
> Yes, you should.
Doesn't this make NIMBYism even more tempting? I've got to be against any changes near my land, because it's going to increase my taxes and push me to move. In addition to not liking change in general.
A rational economic actor would not be a NIMBY under these conditions, because the increase in land values exceeds the increased tax they would pay, and so they could always sell their property for a profit and buy another one farther away from infrastructure if they don't like it.
In reality, people are change-averse and irrational for a variety of reasons, chief among them emotional attachment. So it wouldn't surprise me if people resist development in practice. A lot of NIMBYism is already of this vein - upzoning a property usually increases its value (because it can be redeveloped into more units), but is also frequently fiercely resisted by existing residents who won't sell at any price.
Note that a system can be rational even if participants are not - capitalism is, because actors who are irrational eventually go bankrupt and are forced to work for actors who are economically rational. That doesn't stop it from being unpopular, which, again, capitalism is. Many of the political issues getting an LVT adopted stem from this.
If you have a hundred thousand properties to collect data on, you can get a pretty good idea of "a 3BR unit increases the value of the property this much, a 2BR unit increases it by this much, X feet in height result in this change in value, per parking space the value increases by this much". Sophisticated real-estate investors and the banks that fund them are running this calculation anyway, that's how they know which properties are good deals. Once you have a formula for this, you plug in the stats of the property in question to figure out the value of the improvements, and then the unimproved value of the land is everything left over.
The price of the property is based on the return that the landlord can return. This should be obvious.
If you increase the tax by 4x, the most likely result is the market value will drop from $1 million to something like $250k-500k. The renters will be paying the same value. The new owner will have the same ROI that the previous owner had. Just different buying price and lower return per rental.
Also, what people don't get is that the same people that set the tax are the people that have the land and the political and economic power. Why would they do something that goes againt their best interest? We're all cool and open to all kinds of things until it happens in out backyards.
Not really. This assumes it must remain a rental property.
What will happen is that this $1M property which was previously a rental now becomes a ~$1M property which is owner-occupied. The owner isn't going to take a 500K-750K loss just to keep it a rental.
Then why are investors a problem?
If investors are investing in land and leaving it empty waiting for the local city to build valuable infrastructure around them before they sell it, that's a major problem.
A land value tax will see the former do better and the later to do much worse.
No, not like that.
As a society we need to decide if we want to have the cake or eat the cake. If I own the land, I own the land. The city has a responsibility to consider this (and many other things) when developing infra.
There are a multitude of levers that can be pulled to deincentivize this behavior, but the tragedy is that the people who benefit from it are hand in hand with the people that make and apply the rules.
This seems to assume that a rental property is forever a rental property and will continue to be rented at market price no matter what.
But that's not true. It's only a rental property if the owner can rent it out and not be losing money. If the conditions change (like taxes on it) so that's it can no longer be profitable, it is taken off the rental market (most likely by selling to someone who wants to live in it).
If that's one unit, no problem, the renter can go elsewhere. In the proposal being discussed where all rental units have a 4x tax increase, this applies to all rental units at once. Rent prices go way up and most rental units disappear from the market.
This is why I am for the value of all land being taxed. No distortions.
but, that's the point. you can't reduce real estate prices without reducing real estate prices.
> every property owner isn't going to operate at a loss
So they will then sell. But who would buy at current prices? The main effect of a change in tax rate is a one-time change in the market price of the property. Someone won't be under water if the property was $1. The market will find a new clearing price.
I'm sympathetic to current owners, and this is why I prefer to combine the implementation of the Land Value Tax with a Land Tax credit equal to the existing value of the land to the deed owner. This will allow everyone to be net neutral over the transition period, and would even be net positive as the risk of ones property value dropping in recessions would go away.