> Moreover, it is not guaranteed to facilitate viable third parties; this has not happened in Australia, for example, where it is the rule.
Australia has a Conservative colalition of two parties, Liberal and National with similar but unaligned goals, and a nominally Left (for some value of Left but not Copmmunist and not the trade union party it once was) Party in Labor.
That's three majors.
Australia also has (largely thanks to RC) a number of independants and small parties that also have a voice both the upper and lower houses (of the various States, and in the Federal Government).
The need to negotiate with small players to build numbers to pass desired policy is a major factor in avoiding the kind of extreme polarisation seen within the central north american region.
That being said, the problem with Fukuyama is that for all intents and purposes, forecasting the future in terms of grand narratives is impossible to do accurately.
Range (Score or Star) voting are significantly better.
> Fukuyama argues that history should be viewed as an evolutionary process, and that the end of history, in this sense, means that liberal democracy is the final form of government for all nations. According to Fukuyama, since the French Revolution, liberal democracy has repeatedly proven to be a fundamentally better system (ethically, politically, economically) than any of the alternatives, and so there can be no progression from it to an alternative system. Fukuyama claims not that events will stop occurring in the future, but rather that all that will happen in the future (even if totalitarianism returns) is that democracy will become more and more prevalent in the long term.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Las...
I'm going by his articulation on a recent podcast with Chris Hayes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zY9yBZm_57w
He would say that its not that liberal democracy is some teleological final state. But more like a local optimum that we can't hill climb out of. There simply aren't different ideas about how to organize states "beyond" democracy.
I think the shift is subtle but important. It implies a lack of ideas as opposed to a "prediction" about the consequences of 1991.
having ideas and sharing them is of more value.
He dismisses rank-choice but mostly because it will take too long to get it everywhere. To me, it seems the best way to allow all sorts of candidates to run, and will likely reduce the chances of the wacko extreme candidates we're getting today.
Finally, he mentions Yang's new Forward Party, which imho likely won't do much good, but has the potential of causing another Ralph Nader-esque impact on a future election. Although we can't tell what would have happened with a Gore presidency, I'm almost sure we would not have invaded Iraq. Let's all hope the Forward Party dies a quick and painless death.