Our users, on the other hand, are not making any real noise about it because from their point of view it's the natural extension of SSO (from the point of view of that being the only bit that they will interact with in any meaningful way) and that was something that reduced friction for them too.
We've not suffered from the name really, to be honest.
Nevertheless, it's always a little unsettling whenever some Internet rando confidently posits that a phrase conveys a certain meaning or emotional reaction to people without any evidence whatsoever. I mean, come on, do a little market research. Do your homework. (The same goes for me!)
IOW, "when zero trust networking is fully implemented" is a precondition that isn't always realistically achievable, especially in large distributed organizations where you don't always have complete control over what your colleagues build and deploy.
Mere destructive criticism is cheap and easy, and isn't worth posting here IMO. Creativity and success, OTOH, are frequently difficult and worthy of praise and sharing.
It's a marketing term ultimately and any practitioner should be able to understand what it means. If they don't it's kinda on them.
Google explicitly positions BeyondCorp as a replacement for VPN:
> BeyondCorp is a Zero Trust security framework modeled by Google that shifts access controls from the perimeter to individual devices and users. The end result allows employees to work securely from any location without the need for a traditional VPN.
1. Clients authenticate servers
2. Servers authenticate clients
3. Communications are encrypted and auditable
4. Fine grained authorization using available context like device health
You could have employees hold a client cert, connect to a VPN, have the VPN attest the employee's state, and then provide them access to a subnet. From that subnet they can continue talking to other services that also perform authn/authz. The VPN doesn't make it "less" zero trust, it's just that the traditional VPN model is one where it's the single point of auth.
I'm not really convinced the name is a real problem. We use a lot of terms that aren't obvious and it works just fine. For example, http. First you have to learn that means Hypertext Transfer Protocol, then you have to learn what Hypertext means, and then you have to learn that it's used for a lot more than Hypertext these days.
If a car company was called 'GJKN', and that stood for some obscure acronym, you'd just memorize that. But you'd probably be a lot more confused by the car company 'NoWheels' when their car still has wheels, just in different places.
Learning a name -> feature mapping isn't a problem in itself, but the fact that you have to do it before you get an approximately correct idea regarding what it's about is an unnecessary inefficiency.
Turns out it is just a different phrase for the existing concept of defense in depth.
Certainly one could define defence in depth as a component of zero trust I guess (very vaguely) but they represent different perspectives.
Defence in depth is a technologically focused approach: implementing redundant checks at multiple architectural layers of a stack.
Zero trust is about the high-level approach to perimeters and ACLs, including not only tech & stack architecting, but organisational messaging / policy / culture.
I would argue that the "Zero Trust" definition in the BeyondCorp architecture is somewhat an opposite of "defence in depth" because it appears to advocate so many single points of failure. You have to trust the TPM manufacturer's claims. You have to be certain the software running the public facing login portal is free of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. You have to trust your whole business on the source code of a single vendor providing the software for centralised user authentication. You have to trust the few employees who manage these single points of failure with an entire business rather than a small part of the business.
Defence in depth is either achieved by implementing systems in series, or in parallel.
Systems in series have decreased availability and thus have a downside of an exploitation in any one system in series being a more likely occurrence (larger attack surface), and upon an occurrence, the availability of all systems in series is impacted. For example, let there be two proxies in series from two vendors, each proxy performing deep packet inspection and analysis of files being transferred. To get a file transferred through both proxies, an attacker has to convince both proxies (independently implemented) that the file is not malicious, and thus it is harder to fool two systems rather than one. However an attacker can find a content parsing vulnerability in either proxy (double the attack surface) and use the access gained to more readily deny service, leak information or inject or modify information.
Systems in parallel introduce a larger attack surface and thus exploitation occurrences are more likely, but each occurrence has significantly decreased consequence. An example of such an architecture is different divisions of a business using SFTP, TLS or SMB protocols to transfer files, and different divisions using different implementations of those protocols in different software. An encryption vulnerability in one implementation of one protocol may only expose two divisions of the business, but the other divisions would not be directly impacted. It is likely that incidents occur more frequently as there is a much larger attack surface, but each incident has a less severe outcome.
[1] https://storage.googleapis.com/pub-tools-public-publication-...
[2] Example: https://login.corp.google.com/
[3] Example of how device attestation could work: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/
Sounds like an impoverished way of saying "ambient authority is bad" ;)
(I do concede the article's point that marketing actually matters.)
#NoVPN or Zero Perimeter could be better slogans.
On the other hand, the only people I have seen confused are technical people that (incorrectly) think they have identified an inconsistency; non-technical folks seem fine to just map name->feature-set.