For example, most official Debian[1] and Ubuntu[2] package repositories currently use HTTP (not HTTPS) by default for content retrieval.
That's reliable thanks to public-key encryption; the packages are signed, and the receiver verifies the signature.
Someone able to inspect your network traffic could, for example, tell that you've downloaded a genuine copy of "cowsay". Or they could detect that the server replied with a tampered copy (something that your client should reject as invalid).
[1] - https://wiki.debian.org/SourcesList#Example_sources.list
Sadly, it could have been better with varying options of choices in connection, stream and content encryption methods, but that simply isn't feasible with the users and scale we're currently working with.
For niches (and operating systems and software packages are niches, even if an end user is somewhere under the hood using it) it can still be pretty good, especially considering the mirror system where you distribute files to mirrors which might themselves use TLS but you'd still want the distribution authority to be the only one signing those files.
But then you've bootstrapped the trust somehow. If you were to download an ISO from that not-HTTPS website, you'd be at risk.
You are making assumptions about my user agent.
If you use insecure JS-executing browsers and problematic ISPs (I know not everyone has a choice), consider VPN or an extension that forces HTTPS.
That's why Mozilla and Google have been working on the transition to HTTPS for years.
Mozilla announced deprecating HTTP back in Apr/2015 [1], to allow plenty of time for everyone to upgrade.
1. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/04/30/deprecating-non...
A simple HTTP redirect to download a PDF file can also lead compromising the user's computer.
You can protect yourself by going directly to the URL and checking you're on the right domain.
If you don't enforce HTTPS everywhere, any website is potentially malicious, e.g. visiting http://cookierecipes.com can have the same consequences.
HTTPS doesn't prevent you from going to weebsite.com. There are other security measures for that, but it's also your responsibility to check.
Putting the responsibility for checking the rest on the user is honestly a mistake. They could be dyslexic, and may not be able to detect a typo. They could also be 85 years old and not understand half of what you are saying. These are the problems browsers should be focusing on. Security is not as easy as encrypting the protocol and saying everything else is user error.
The websites that aren't willing or able to do so are, in my experience, some of the more precious ones we have on the Internet. The websites that aren't trying to monetize their visitors are the ones that get Thanos:ed out of apparent existence. What gets lost isn't the spam or the malicious websites, they of course adapt. What gets lost is the unique views, the personal websites, like from some 80 year old who has meticulously published a catalogue of his astrolabe collection online over the last 30 years.
CDNs are purposefully installed in MitM positions. That's a risk that the sites owner has to manage and it's an optional one at that.
A well funded actor would probably use different kind of vectors and not even bother with website MitM.
Firstly it punishes those in the worst situations. Those in countries with abusive political systems, those who have no legal representation, etc.
I don't even believe the idea is right in practice "serves to preserve the status quo" is just wrong in this case. HTTPS completely breaks most terrible things ISPs can do. It completely dismantles the system.
HTTPS offers virtually no defense against a state actor.
> I don't even believe the idea is right in practice "serves to preserve the status quo" is just wrong in this case. HTTPS completely breaks most terrible things ISPs can do. It completely dismantles the system.
HTTPS doesn't dismantle the system at all. You're still stuck with no other option for an ISP, which means you are not going to get favorable terms. And even with HTTPS, you need to look up the IP for the servers you're going to visit, and ISPs can snoop on your DNS traffic and sell information about how you, the IP (or the person), regularly looks up the IP for abortionpills.example.com (or connects to the IP associated with the server).
- Identification (bi-directional)
- Privacy (or secrecy)
A side-effect of those are tamper resistance. As the internet got older, more tamper-based abuse was happening and the benefit of tamper resistance became practically more important than the identification part. To be realistic: most people don't actually know how to identify what website they are on, and they also don't know what the identity should be. This is also why EV (extended validation) is completely worthless and mostly purged from webbrowsers.
https://www.troyhunt.com/heres-why-your-static-website-needs...
If your problem is some ancient device that cannot speak reasonably recent protocols, the solution is to not allow that device on the main internet directly. That might mean the device itself has to live behind a proxy, or it has to use a remote browser, or it might (as you might guess) simply be a matter of decommissioning the device or only using it on a local network.
Any time the general security of a system is downgraded for some edge case, that same downgrade can be used to attack everyone else.