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Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by hannob on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @03:51PM (#31992852)
There's no need for one.

How NIST chose algorithms in the past was done in quite diverse ways. Sometimes they merely said "this is a standard" and people could comment and the comments were ignored. This is basically what happened with Dual EC DRBG, whcih is the likely example you're referring to.

However the way this standardization worked - and several others before, like AES and SHA-3 - is that NIST made a public competition. They basically asked everyone to submit proposals and then asked everyone to find flaws in theses proposals.

These competitions have a very good reputation in the cryptographic community. An algorithm like Dual EC where the issues were quite obvious would've never survived such a process.

The thing you should look at is the process, not the organization.

Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by mort96 on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:14PM (#31993111)
I don't understand cryptography enough to vet algorithms. I need to trust an authority to tell me which algorithms to use. I do not trust NIST as an authority. That's why it would be nice to have an actually trustworthy authority which does similar work to NIST.

EDIT: To more specifically address the process: If NIST wanted to get people to trust a shady algorithm, they could have some amazing cryptographers invent an algorithm which stands up to scrutiny, but which has some extremely hard to notice flaw which only they know about. They could then make those cryptographers submit the algorithm to NIST, and, in a seemingly fair way, pick the subtly broken algorithm as the winner. I can't know whether this happened of course, and it probably didn't, but we fundamentally have to trust that NIST wouldn't do something like that... and we do know that they would do, and indeed have done, something like that.

Maybe the process is such that this attack, and any other kind of attack, is impossible. If that's the case, please do cite something which goes into detail on that.

Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by mabbo on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:17PM (#31993150)
What if those trustworthy organizations were to tell you: "We trust this NIST competition result, and so should you"?
Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by mort96 on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:22PM (#31993214)
Maybe, if their reasoning for trusting the NIST competition result holds up to scrutiny. Do you have any links to trustworthy organizations which wholly endorse the results, with a detailed write-up as to why?
Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by jvanderbot on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:53PM (#31993563)
I think we can revisit OP:

> However the way this standardization worked - and several others before, like AES and SHA-3 - is that NIST made a public competition. They basically asked everyone to submit proposals and then asked everyone to find flaws in theses proposals.

> These competitions have a very good reputation in the cryptographic community.

A very brief google search provided citations to the proposals and counter-attacks for your perusal.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_Post-Quantum_Cryptography...

Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by DennisP on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @06:11PM (#31994392)
NIST wouldn't get away with choosing an algorithm that has been shown to have vulnerabilities, which is the only thing it could do is come up with an algorithm with a subtle unnoticed flaw. And that algorithm has to have performance at least as good as the other algorithms in the contest.

But if it can come up with a competitive algorithm with a subtle unnoticed flaw, than that attack would work almost as well in a contest hosted by some other organization. They wouldn't be able to guarantee the win, but they would still have a good shot at it.

Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by giomasce on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:18PM (#31993160)
Who do you trust as an authority?
Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by mort96 on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:19PM (#31993178)
I don't know, but organizations which haven't duped people into using broken crypto before would be a good start.
Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by anfilt on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @06:25PM (#31994516)
Like if you dont like the US NIST standards there is the Japanese CRYPTREC, and European NESSIE. Alot the same algos as NIST though.
Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by capableweb on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @04:25PM (#31993247)
> The thing you should look at is the process, not the organization.

Then there shouldn't be a problem with another organization hosting the contest than NIST? Since I'm probably not alone in not being able to trust them anymore.

Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by tptacek on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @05:23PM (#31993896)
There isn't a problem, except that nobody will take the other organization's contest especially seriously, or write its name into contracts.
Re:NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic... by astrange on Tuesday July 05, 2022 @07:04PM (#31994819)
Nobody trusted Dual_EC_DRBG despite its NIST accreditation. It was always obviously weird to experts, and it wasn't simple and performant enough for non-experts.

The reason it was enabled in some systems is 1. libraries (like openssl and ffmpeg) used to implement and ship every algorithm on Earth for pride reasons 2. NSA bribed RSA BSafe to make it the default.

You don't have a solution for #2.