EDIT: To more specifically address the process: If NIST wanted to get people to trust a shady algorithm, they could have some amazing cryptographers invent an algorithm which stands up to scrutiny, but which has some extremely hard to notice flaw which only they know about. They could then make those cryptographers submit the algorithm to NIST, and, in a seemingly fair way, pick the subtly broken algorithm as the winner. I can't know whether this happened of course, and it probably didn't, but we fundamentally have to trust that NIST wouldn't do something like that... and we do know that they would do, and indeed have done, something like that.
Maybe the process is such that this attack, and any other kind of attack, is impossible. If that's the case, please do cite something which goes into detail on that.
> However the way this standardization worked - and several others before, like AES and SHA-3 - is that NIST made a public competition. They basically asked everyone to submit proposals and then asked everyone to find flaws in theses proposals.
> These competitions have a very good reputation in the cryptographic community.
A very brief google search provided citations to the proposals and counter-attacks for your perusal.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_Post-Quantum_Cryptography...
But if it can come up with a competitive algorithm with a subtle unnoticed flaw, than that attack would work almost as well in a contest hosted by some other organization. They wouldn't be able to guarantee the win, but they would still have a good shot at it.
Then there shouldn't be a problem with another organization hosting the contest than NIST? Since I'm probably not alone in not being able to trust them anymore.
The reason it was enabled in some systems is 1. libraries (like openssl and ffmpeg) used to implement and ship every algorithm on Earth for pride reasons 2. NSA bribed RSA BSafe to make it the default.
You don't have a solution for #2.
How NIST chose algorithms in the past was done in quite diverse ways. Sometimes they merely said "this is a standard" and people could comment and the comments were ignored. This is basically what happened with Dual EC DRBG, whcih is the likely example you're referring to.
However the way this standardization worked - and several others before, like AES and SHA-3 - is that NIST made a public competition. They basically asked everyone to submit proposals and then asked everyone to find flaws in theses proposals.
These competitions have a very good reputation in the cryptographic community. An algorithm like Dual EC where the issues were quite obvious would've never survived such a process.
The thing you should look at is the process, not the organization.