I think you may have missed the point (of course, it could be me that missed the point :-)

The argument was that for a physical system to be a computer, an element of intent or interpretation is needed; otherwise it's just a bunch of stuff doing what stuff does naturally. Perhaps the (horribly flawed) iron bar example is making the point that whether some configuration of magnetic dipoles is a computer depends on your choice of mappings from that configuration to some state of some Turing machine - which is equivalent to an interpretation.

> computer, an element of intent or interpretation is needed; otherwise it's just a bunch of stuff doing what stuff does naturall

I mean this violates nothing and I am completely confused why it is a concern.

AI face recognizing cameras are outdoors and run 24/7, and you are trying to say that things like it is not computing and unable to carry out computation?

> and you are trying to say that things like it is not computing

On the contrary.

The AI-powered camera obviously has intent behind it. It's a computer.

A random collection of stuff, on the other hand, could happen to be arranged in such a way that it computes something; but if it wasn't designed that way, and if nobody is trying to give it inputs and interpret the outputs, then it's not a computer, it's just a bag of stuff.

For example, consider the orbiting bodies of the solar system. I expect their motions can be used to compute various functions, although I don't know what functions. But they weren't arranged deliberately to perform computations, and AFAIAA nobody's intepreting them as a computer. Ergo, they are just a "bag of stuff", doing what stuff does naturally.

Same for the iron bar.

You're just re-stating (1). I understood (1) fine and addressed it directly.

Observation isn't required for Turing machines to exist. A computer is still a computer even if it has no user or doesn't compute anything deemed useful.

i.e., Whether something is a computer or not doesn't depend on interpretation or observation. (Directly saying 1 is wrong)

Yes, I'm restating (1). That's why my remark was introduced with the phrase "The argument was [...]". In particular, I was trying to rationalise the dumb "iron bar" example as a justification for (1).

I don't think you addressed anything; you just flatly denied (1), without offering any reasoning. In particular, you don't seem to have tried to understand the author's attempt to justify (1) using iron bars.

For my part, I'm not sure about (1). As far as I can see, there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all. So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer. Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder.

No. Some things are Turing machines and some are not. Human interaction and interpretation are not involved.

This applies to any model of computation. Cellular autonoma for instance. A mind is not required to interact with the system for computation to take place.

Take a living cell. No mind is in the loop when the cell computes the manufacture of organelles from stored data.

> Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder.

No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer.

The fact that memory doesn't compute by itself isn't evidence that a mind needs to be involved for computation to take place. The argument is really stupid.

> No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer.

Agreed; that was a rather throwaway rhetorical remark. But if you concede that four socks can be a memory, then it's not a huge jump to see that a bunch of arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer.

My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective; it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results.

Again, no, not anything can a computer. If you like Turing machines, there are specific requirements for what makes a Turing machine. None of these things are ingredients of a Turing machine:

    * Observation
    * Measurement
    * Interpretation
    * Intent
    * A mind

> My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective

You are wrong. It is discretely defined. Read about the requirements for a Turing machine.

    * When the requirements are *not* met,
      subjectivity can not turn something
      into a computer.
    * When the requirements *are* met,
      subjectivity can not change the fact
      that it is computer.

It's obvious that subjectivity has no effect -- either in the matter of classifying computers, or allowing computation to take place.

> it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results.

Again, refuted, in so many different ways. Here's an obvious one which I will restate:

    * Cells inarguably perform computation.
      They pre-date minds by billions of years.

Put a different way, if a Turing Machine computes in the woods and there's no one around to see it, computation will still have taken place. The burden of proof would be on you to say otherwise. I only see two very messy and wrong arguments:

A) Iron bars don't compute by themselves --> A mind is needed to "map" iron bars to "states of an arbitrary Turing machine"

It doesn't follow. Iron bars don't compute on their own because they are just the memory component. What is missing is MACHINERY WITH SPECIFIC PROPERTIES to complete a Turing machine. If the machinery is present, computation is possible. No mind necessary.

B) Socks are a computer if I decide they are --> arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer --> deciding is necessary to make computers.

It doesn't follow. While computers could be made of just about anything, fully arbitrary objects cannot be computers. Only specific systems yield computation. Decision has nothing to do with it. Not even observation is required.

> there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all.

You're arguing my point. "discovering" Turing machines ... meaning some things are already Turing machines before a mind became involved.

> So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer.

You say "So it seems" and "IFF" but it does not follow at all. (b) is not supported. Computation can happen without "someone".

At best, you're arguing that trees falling in the forrest make no sound.

Anyway, why do I think I have time for this ...

I don't think you do have time for this, because your "arguments" amount to a series of bald assertions.

Name one.

I showed you that subjectivity doesn’t effect whether computation occurs. Several ways.

If you disagree you should really be editing Wikipedia: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_of_computation Why don’t you go add your theory there?

It’s silly because it’s obvious. If you understand cells, you understand that computation in the absence of subjectivity has been happening on Earth for billions of years.

(Mic drop)

> I showed you that subjectivity doesn’t effect whether computation occurs.

You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it. You also made a number of appeals to (uncited) authority concerning the nature of computers.

You made an argument from cells; I presume that was to do with the way that DNA and so on works. Although not all cells have DNA...

Anyway. I concede that was an argument, and not a bald assertion. But it's a circular argument; if your definition of "computer" includes the operation of DNA, then the conclusion that a computer can exist without interpretation or intent is unavoidable. You're definition begs the question.

> You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it.

You're not understanding what I said. Last time:

Turing Machines have a specific set of necessary ingredients.

That's not a "bald assertion" or an "appeal to authority". It's an observation about the theory of Turing machines [1].

Whether or not a physical system has those ingredients is an _objective_ matter.

Also an observation. In case you need to think it through, there was a simple argument which you cannot rationally refute:

i) If one of the ingredients is missing, "subjectively" wishing something is a Turing Machine will not make it so.

ii) If all the ingredients are present, "subjectively" wishing that something isn't a Turing Machine will not change the fact that it is.

Conclusion: subjectivity has no effect on whether something is or is not a Turing machine. QED.

----

You're the one making unsupported assertions and talking in circles.

I can see that you're going to reply with more disagreement. Please imagine that my response is "I said good day sir!"

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine#Description

> Please imagine that my response is "I said good day sir!"

That sounds a lot like "Anyway, why do I think I have time for this ... "

It's clear to me that "stuff" can be arranged to work as a Turing Machine (or some other kind of computer) without design or intent. Whether it is such a thing or not depends on how it is used; a Turing Machine that is given random inputs, or whose outputs don't mean anything to anyone, is a computer only in a formal sense. If nobody knows that some thing is a computer, I'm not sure that it's computer-ness is meaningful.

So that's why I think intent and interpretation are relevant.

True. Quantum behavior is computing linear algebra ever since the Big Bang, and we came accross to discover this fact 15e9 years later.

That's not a good example, as it's very hard to call particles following the laws of physics "a computation" - what would be the computer in this case? What is the program?

A much better example is the machinery inside every living cell that is interpreting the DNA or RNA to produce certain proteins - there, it's much clearer there is a computational process happening. Certain specific structures inside the nucleus are the computer, and the DNA molecule is the program they are following. We even know that you can change the program and get predictable, different behavior.

How is it not? Quantum Mechanics and quantum field theory applies everywhere except for the black holes. Human can even harness the power by building quantum computer by that. So here you tried to deny the exist of quantum computing paradigm, a completely different computation approach?

No, I am not denying anything.

My point is this: say an electron emits a photon and changes speed, in perfect accordance to the standard model and QFT. I don't think it makes sense to say that the electron "computed" the energy of the photon, or its own change of speed. It just happened, there was no computation going on here.

Even in a CPU, it doesn't make sense to say that the transistors, or even logical gates, are "computing" how much electricity passes through them. The entire system of transistors arranged into logical gates arranged into a processor is doing computation of the program written in memory, but the subcomponents are only following the simple laws of physics.

In a quantum computer, the same is true - the computer itself may be running Shor'a algorithm, but each individual qubit is simply doing the few things that the laws of physics allow it to do.

I think the argument is more that the electron and photon are subjective interpretations of the observable consequence of some computation, not that they are computing things in and of themselves.

Thanks this is exactly what I am trying to say.

We dont know exactly how the universe is doing or how the photons do to themselves, but by doing experiments, scientists figured out the law of computiation of this vague "universe computer" a.k.a laws of physics.

And since scientist's discovery do not violate the actually behavior of the physical world, there established a isomorphism. And the very same law is used in quantum computing, mainly, in chemistry. And everything success and predictable. It is a successful scientific theory. Under this notion, it is nothing wrong to say that the quantum world is doing some kind of computation underneath because it is the current understanding of how the universe works.

To my mind, I think that if you want to say that the universe is a computer, then you can't say it's doing linear algebra, even though the behavior of particles is described by linear algebra.

If you want to model the universe as a computer, than its basic operations are the interactions described in the Standard Model, and the symbols it works on are particles&fields that exist. But the universe computer is not resolving a linear algebra equation to decide what happens when an electron emits a photon. Instead, the electron emitting a photon with some energy etc. is one of the elementary operations of the universe computer.

Coming back to the CPU example, a basic operation in a CPU is setting a bit to 1. That operation is not divisible into any other more elementary operations from the point of view of modeling the physical CPU as a computer. Of course, there are other physical phenomena going down to the SM that are the realization of this basic operation, but those are not part of the modeling: the CPU computer, as a model, works by flipping bits.

Similarly, for QM, the universe computer works by doing one of the possible interactions from the standard model. As far as we know, there is no layer of detail underneath this, even if the interactions of the standard model are indeed linear algebra.

One important way in which saying "the universe is computing linear algebra" is wrong is that, as far as we know, the universe is instantly calculating the solutions of the linear equations - the electron doesn't go into an "emitting" state, then emit a photon with the appropriate values some time later after the computation is finished.

Bascially your assumption is that something that looks and works like an Intel CPU carry out an operation, that can be called a computation, everything else is not. But sorry this is not the only method to "compute". You are limiting the definition of computiation and try too hard to justify all false assumption that you have been made.

My assumption is that something like a Turing machine, or like a reduction in Lambda calculus, or like a demonstration with the basic laws of predicate logic (all known equivalent models of computation) is a computer.

Ok then, what is the computer running that computation, and what are the symbols it is manipulating to produce the movement of the electron and photon?

(I am assuming you are not referring to human knowledge of the electron or photon, which - if we accept that consciousness is computational - is obviously the result of a computation in our brains).

I have no idea, I’m just saying you can conceive of physical phenomena being the subjective experience of existing within a computed environment. If, on the other hand, the computation happens within the physical substrate of the thing it’s computing… that seems weird to me.

Well. FYI, unitary transformation, creation and annihilation operator, etc.

Are these physical objects? Do they have mass, energy, volume, a position or speed, charge, color charge, weak hyper charge, spin etc?

The operation of adding and subtracting per se in classical computers also lacking these physical properties. If you use this as your counterargument, namely classical computer can compute without the inherent operation owning a physical property, then you left yourself with no ground of saying that quantum computing is invalid. You better check your logic.

Have you verified if the particles in your CPU are following the laws of physics and doing computation as you read this?

What do you mean by "verified"?

We are discussing what is ultimately a matter of philosophy - "what is a useful definition of computation".

I am claiming that the model of the electron and other particles, and how they interact to form an electrical circuit with transistors, and how these electrical circuits react to current when in the pattern we call "logical gates" do not conform to what is normally understood by "computation".

I am also claiming that the ensemble formed from these logical gates does fit the concept of computation, that you couldn't derive its behavior directly from innate physical laws - the behavior is governed by the program it is manipulating, and can be changed.

Finally, I am claiming that the living cell is more similar to our CPU than to the electrical circuit or moving electrons in the way it processes DNA to produce various proteins.