There's a reason why code signing exists as a security measure.
For these people, running the script or downloading a signed GitHub release is equivilent, in both cases they do not read the source code of the software that they are running.
There is nothing stopping you from 1) reading the script before running it 2) reading the source code of Deno and any dependencies 3) compiling from source yourself. For most people, this is a waste of time. Trust has to start somewhere to build something great.
The most obvious case: someone compromises the installation script on the actual real deno server. Right now the webserver there is returning an HTTP/307 to an HTTP/302 to the "current" installation script file. Any compromise of the webserver makes this very dangerous.
Contrast that with proper signed packages, code signed sources, etc. There it requires compromise of the developer's systems and signing keys, which at least can be a far harder thing to attack if they're doing things securely.
Is there a reason Deno is not packaged as a repo in official apt, deb, yum, etc repositories?
2. copy/pasting includes invisible characters that aren't seen until executed
both of these things happen regularly
orthogonally, curl|sh (usually) circumvents the package manager and makes uninstallation difficult
Yes, the page offers a link to the "Releases" page at their github repository. However, anyone familiar with any kind of UX will understand immediately that this is effectively burying the link and subtly makes the statement that you don't really want to bother with that other way of doing things. They also don't provide a gzipped/bzipped tarball for the linux install but a zip file instead, adding an additional barrier/dependency.
I understand this is an area where security is losing the tug of war to ease of distribution/access but it pains me to see it on any project, let alone the potentially good ones.