While your last paragraph is technically true, ACLs can also be applied on files from network shares.
And of course (just as on Linux), even on single, non-networked machines, only very technical users will realistically be able to access files they are not authorised for.
1. If we're talking about desktops systems, privesc is trivial in either OS. In Linux you can do a million things to privesc, such as snooping passwords via X11, modifying the various user files like ~/.bashrc with aliases, etc. On Windows UAC isn't even intended to be a barrier.
2. If we're talking about servers, I'm not sure that Windows is 10:1 worse on privescs.
On the flipside, all it takes to manipulate sudo on Unix systems is to write a TTY emulator that just middlewares between the user and sudo. Then just alias via bashrc or any number of other places that can prompt for a user password. There is not protection sudo can deploy against that. Polkit helps a bit but X11 isn't great at helping there either since other programs can just send keystrokes.
CVE database is pretty much alike.
Windows is not a single-user OS. Even a standard "desktop" installation can support multiple sessions through terminal services, but usually it is not configured to allow multiple concurrent interactive sessions.
The culprit is usually the insane Windows ACL permission system. Unix permissions look like "rwxr-xr-x" while a very simple example of a Windows permission is:
D:(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;WD)
Windows is a single user OS. If you are depending on its local user permission access control to be anything more than advisory you are going to have a bad time.