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Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by nimbius on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:10PM (#30770169)
>The Okta service has not been breached and remains fully operational. There are no corrective actions that need to be taken by our customers.

despite an overwhelming preponderance of damning evidence from twitter (as well as the hacker themselves) you've somehow managed to find yourselves secure instead?

Christs whiskers thats some impressive doublethink. Its also an excellent opportunity to fall on a sword that gives future attackers --hat colour dismissed-- an immediate incentive to simply publish regardless as you dont appear to be acting with very much good faith. if this sort of an attack is a carrot, you've clearly shown a predilection for the stick.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by GordonS on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:28PM (#30770362)
If there is one thing you want from a 3rd party auth provider, it's trust - this is not the time to play word games.

I'd have far more faith in them if they were transparent about what had happened, what they're doing about it, and how they will make sure it can't happen again.

Instead, they are being weasels - I for one, will not be using their services again, and this behaviour is the reason why.

Here's another example from a couple of years back where they used some really weasely language to claim they weren't vulnerable to a CVE (spoiler: they were):

https://twitter.com/jonoberheide/status/1506280347306188805?...

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by kache_ on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @04:03PM (#30770795)
Monoculturing the west's authorization/identity stack - Is that something we want to do? Authz/Authn as a service is great, until it isn't.

There are pros and cons both ways. You're centralizing the risk, but also centralizing the effort for quality. Perverse incentives however causes loss of quality: saying you fucked up will lose you customers, and some of that sweet, sweet stock value.

The fact that you can work for these companies without security clearance seems a bit insane. The more they grow and centralize, the more of a national security risk they become. It's not hard to get hired at Okta, and when you're in, you're in. At what point is not solving a security bug at Okta that you've discovered and selling it for monero more lucrative than actually fixing the bug? I realize that not everyone is like me and has a strong values that prevents them from doing so, and that scares me. If you're talented, it's super easy to backdoor a system and get around code-review

I'm torn

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by different_sort on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:28PM (#30770367)
Maybe I’m just an unimpressed security professional but I’ve still not seen evidence I’d call a breach. At least not a significant one if you want to argue sublantics.

Workers at organizations get compromised all the time. This doesn’t mean their systems/products are compromised.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by ev1 on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:37PM (#30770487)
I do security (albeit not CISO or compliance-style, but commercial anticheat), and in my opinion, if a support agent's account was used by a third party to view anything about my account without permission - any undisclosed email address or name, their system was compromised and it is a data breach.

IMO, support agents also should not have the ability to view or access a customer's account without some form of time limited, auto-resetting-to-opted-out default confirmation that support can view the account from an existing logged in admin.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by kichik on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:45PM (#30770571)
Yeah, the screenshots they admit are real clearly show Slack, JIRA and AWS being open. What did the attackers see there? Were the customers whose data was viewed notified? How can Okta tell if that data is sensitive or not without taking to their customers?
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by GauntletWizard on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:53PM (#30770659)
A competent security response to this would have been "Yes, they compromised one of our support technicians. We've initiated an audit and are sending out e-mails containing all of the actions that support representative performed for each customer to that customer's administrator"
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by jclulow on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:33PM (#30770423)
If through compromising those workers outside parties gain access to sensitive systems, and that situation is not promptly detected and corrected, then the system _is_ compromised.

Okta is not just a bunch of software, it's also staff and processes, and the result is a trusted service they provide to customers. If that service is compromised, it doesn't really seem to matter how?

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by haswell on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:40PM (#30770516)
> If that service is compromised, it doesn't really seem to matter how?

I hear what you're saying, but the how does really matter, and will change how customers perceive the issue and make decisions about how to react.

e.g. "databases were open to the Internet and all data has been siphoned" lands quite differently than "a staff member abused their privileges but the scope of abuse was limited to xyz".

If I'm a customer, it tells me a lot about what Okta needs to do next, and how much I should freak out right now. It's still extremely problematic that a staff member (1st or 3rd party) could abuse such privileges, and I immediately have questions about how those privileges were abused and to what actual effect, but it's a fundamentally different problem than other types of breaches.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by Closi on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @05:32PM (#30771847)
How it happened doesn't change the fact that they have been breached.

If I was a bank and claimed that I haven't been robbed, an insider just transferred billions of pounds out of the bank and then fled, I think everyone would rightly say "What are you talking about, you have been robbed!"

It doesn't matter if it was done by a guy in a black and white stripey t-shirt, or if it was done by a rogue internal employee, a bank robbery is a bank robbery.

In fact, the ability of an internal staff member to transfer lots of money out of the bank probably signifies a more significant and systemic issue - particularly if i've lost my money and the bank refuses to acknowledge they have been breached/robbed (it was just an internal rogue staff member, not a robbery! our security hasn't been breached!).

A bit of a stretched analogy - but i'm sure everyone gets the point. Security isn't just about technical security - it's the whole process involved in making sure these things don't happen. A banks 'technical' security might be great, but the bank would still be considered horribly insecure if a staff member can transfer any money out of an account. Equally an auth service might be 'technically' secure, but the ability of a single rogue staff member to impose a lot of damage suggests more systemic issues.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by haswell on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @06:53PM (#30772659)
> It doesn't matter if it was done by a guy in a black and white stripey t-shirt, or if it was done by a rogue internal employee, a bank robbery is a bank robbery.

I have to respectfully disagree.

Yes, the end result may be the same, but even in a bank robbery, the how matters, and will drive different behaviors from everyone involved: the bank, law enforcement, and customers of that bank.

If as a customer, I learn that a guy in a stripey t-shirt holds a teller at gunpoint, my conclusion goes something like "that's a terrifying situation for the teller, and I hope they're ok". I'm probably not going to stop using that bank.

If on the other hand, I learn that there are systemic issues with bank security, and internal employees have been embezzling funds somehow, I'm probably going to think hard about whether this is a bank I want to do business with.

> Security isn't just about technical security - it's the whole process involved in making sure these things don't happen.

Yes, and when factors are involved that are out of the bank's control (e.g. a crazy person walks in with a gun), it might be fair to ask why the guy got inside to begin with, but the conclusions you draw about such an incident are far different than the conclusions you'd draw if internal employees were involved.

In case this wasn't clear from my earlier comment, I didn't mean to imply that an internal process issue makes any of this ok. But it does make it different than other types of breaches.

Bottom line: the how still matters, not because one type of problem is ok and the other isn't, but because the actions a customer should take / consider will be different depending on how the breach happened.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by Closi on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @02:34AM (#30775626)
To be honest I think we are agreeing but arguing slightly different points.

The how matters, I agree, but it doesn’t change the fact that a breach is a breach.

Different breaches can have different severities, but they are still both breaches.

My issue isn’t on the severity of the breach, it’s that Okta are saying there wasn’t a breach.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by haswell on Wednesday March 23, 2022 @11:36AM (#30779551)
Yeah, I think we're on the same page. The primary focus of my original reply was that the "how" really does matter. I agree that this is still a breach regardless.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by stevage on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @06:19PM (#30772332)
I don't think anyone would call the second case a robbery, they'd call it embezzlement or fraud.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by mardifoufs on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:46PM (#30770582)
If you follow the lapsus telegram, you will see they are claiming they got AWS API keys from the corporate slack. That might be more dangerous than accessing the support console
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by MattGaiser on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:57PM (#30770711)
I can see a Slack breach being far more damaging than policy should effectively permit it to be because plenty of people use it to share things they technically should not.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by ckozlowski on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:31PM (#30770409)
Without proper separation of duties to limit blast radius, it's just as damaging as a software vulnerability. It sounds like that's the real issue here: Compromise of a support engineer lead to far more access than should have been permissible.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by Eyas on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:37PM (#30770485)
Right, but their claim is that there were proper separations that successfully did limit the blast radius.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by Ozzie_osman on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:44PM (#30770551)
Or at the very least, audit logs so they can see what that support engineer's account did during the period that the account was compromised.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by dzhiurgis on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @04:29PM (#30771092)
LAPSUS is ransomware gang - they are absolutely incentivised to spread FUD to extract money from anyone and attract new leakers.

We should not glorify them.

Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by hughrr on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:27PM (#30770359)
This is prime bad PR. This is going to be an absolute shit show.
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by Melatonic on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:16PM (#30770238)
This is going to get interesting in the days ahead
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by Bombthecat on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:23PM (#30770311)
According to gdpr, this post could be illegal (because.. Lie)
Re:Updated Okta Statement on Lapsus$ by jbrownbridge on Tuesday March 22, 2022 @03:40PM (#30770515)
IANAL but this definitely seems like a breach of Art 33 of GDPR as it meets the criteria of involving personal data (list of users was exposed) and the 72 hour window has passed.