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A comment on TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector. Parent comment

Re:TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector by marcosdumay on Wednesday March 09, 2022 @08:53AM (#30614373)
Well, a government could start by mandating that internet peers authenticate their packages, and cutting the access of bad actors.

People can't do that, and it's a very basic defense.

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Re:TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector by kevincox on Wednesday March 09, 2022 @08:56AM (#30614406)
"Mandate private companies protect their customers" sounds very different than "the government should protect everyone" even if the result is similar.
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Re:TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector by teddyh on Wednesday March 09, 2022 @08:59AM (#30614432)
Start by mandating BCP38 (RFC2827).
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Re:TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector by asplake on Wednesday March 09, 2022 @09:11AM (#30614539)
What stops that? (Both its widespread implementation and making it mandatory)
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Re:TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector by marcosdumay on Wednesday March 09, 2022 @09:16AM (#30614589)
You mean what that protects against?

It provides the first part of my post, authenticating the packages.

The second part is cutting out misbehaving connections. On this case on the article, it would be trivial, and governments should be on the ISP shoulders making them make call everywhere and cutting some of their clients. But there are many attacks where the ISPs don't have enough information to act if they implement something like BCP38.

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