iMessage on iOS is part of the OS, and does some message handling in kernelspace. Yes, it has blastdoor, but even since blastdoor sandboxing has been introduced, there have been multiple iMessage CVEs which lead to a full device compromise. See this project zero post for more about iMessage [0].
What I'm trying to say here, is that on an iPhone, no matter what messenger you use, some iMessage exploits can pwn that messenger anyway since iMessage cannot be disabled, and has privileged OS level access.
On the other hand, android does have "google messenger" or whatever the OEM installed, and it may not be uninstallable, but it's sandboxed away from the OS in the same way every other app is. There have been exploits based on kernel-space processing of media attachments on android too, but those actually did depend on the app being used, so if you switched SMS apps to one which rejected such an attachment, or otherwise processed it differently, you actually could be secure. Said another way, on android you actually can turn off the default messenger and use signal for SMS. On iOS, that's not so realistic.
[0]: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-ime...
Do you mean 0.02 or is inflation really running that high?
Which is why I find it suspicous that Signal do not provide the client for non-Android and non-iOS systems, both not very secure.
Matthew Green et al already did: https://securephones.io
> If you're a journalist or dissident then you or your benefactors should be able to purchase a mobile endpoint security monitoring service that will actively monitor for exploitation and prevent known threats based on good intel.
I am actively building one such open source app (for Android). We are half-way there. One my friends was editor-in-chief at a big media company and his frustrations made it clear to me that they were sitting ducks. Though, securing folks in high risk profession is not easy, at all. But one ought to start somewhere. And it is clear, the eventual solution needs to be external to the phones themselves.
I don't think just securing the hardware is enough (though, even that isn't fully done), the software itself remains hard to tame. Add to the fact that folks (including attackers) can "install" arbitrary things on their Androids, the problem gets only worse.
Then, there's the social and legislative aspects as well. For example, no one can raid your home without a search warrant, that's illegal. Similar thing needs to exist in the digital space. This at least thwarts illegal spyware, if not the law enforcement themselves from snooping about people's digital lives.
This would be a nice thing to have, yeah
> If you're a journalist or dissident then you or your benefactors should be able to purchase a mobile endpoint security monitoring service that will actively monitor for exploitation and prevent known threats based on good intel. Crowdstrike is the only company that comes close to supporting this.
lol no. Commercial EDR software sucks whether it is Crowdstrike or Carbon Black or Cylance.
That's like saying commercial firewalls suck. Do you mean the UI perhaps? They all allow you to specify detection rules like with ids and fw but the out of the box stuff is good enough to catch APTs but obviously not perfect. Althougj out of those I can only recommend crowdstrike falcon, defender ATP is also decent. Red teamers have bypasses for some, it's a cat and mouse game but can you find one instance where an actual threat actor intentionally evaded an EDR?
But I also like to share these kind of posts when I want to make example about like the absolute lack of knowledge in terms of security of apple, like having the guts to release to public a system where password files / shadow and sudoers are world writable just shows that they really have no idea what they're doing
And I wouldn't consider myself a fanboy or like justify this kind of posts like mine as "HN is notoriously against apple" I would more likely say that HN audience is a bit into tech, and if you are into tech and understand how systems work then you can't just ignore these kind of things when you see them so you forcefully end up just trying to dodge a system like apple
My 0.2$ on this topic: prevention is nice but not good enough against a persistent or unknown threat. Mobile devices lack EDR coverage, even enterprises install an MDR and forget about it. I want every child process, network connection and interprocess call that falls out of baseline logged. Compromises happen, discovering them months later is the big issue at hand. If you're a journalist or dissident then you or your benefactors should be able to purchase a mobile endpoint security monitoring service that will actively monitor for exploitation and prevent known threats based on good intel. Crowdstrike is the only company that comes close to supporting this.