It's easier to tell the customers to send the logs from the relevant timeframe and narrow down the problem. Maybe instruct them to up the log level a bit and see if the problem surfaces again.
Always log enough to see where the bug is just by looking at the logs. Getting permission to deploy a new version with additional logging might be a bit of a pain.
Figure out how to write a control and prove it to the auditors that it's followed and adheres to both of these, then I guess you're golden. Probably easier said than done.
FFIEC audit handbook excerpts for "Segregation of Duties" [1] and "Principle of least privilege" [2]
[1] https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/information-securit...
[2] https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/information-securit...
Not a problem but rather a fact of life.
This is an organisational weakness not to have figured out a way to make the people responsible for production, also responsible for reproduction and bug fixing.
I've seen companies with a full team of developers who never add new features but only reproduce and fix the errors of the other feature teams, companies with read-only access to obfuscated informations good enough to reproduce without any client reference, companies who localize enough people in each jurisdiction the production is regulated in rather than have everyone out and unable to reach it.
It's an organisational problem, fix it instead of saying it's impossible to be creative with it. And if my experience if anything to go by, regulators and auditors are either misunderstood in wayyy too conservative ways or are themselves misunderstanding in conservative ways their own rules: there always are ways to explain that it's more risky not to maintain production rather than let if rot slowly because "I can't ssh to the box".
While it's always easier to be conservative with vague rules, it's also always possible to be clear faced with absurdity and it's rare people embrace the absurdity: usually they tell you: "I'll lose my job if I don't follow the rule X put in place 20 years ago" and not "I want the production to be offline the entire day during heavy traffic because I think clients prefer when they can't use our software". So, easy: "20 years ago, X. made a mistake - let's show him", and the answer from X is almost always "Why the fuck are you even asking me, ofc exceptions are possible, fix now we do the process after". And "doing the process" is often to can the old rule, or make it change so much it loses all fear factor and start being actually useful.
Give up and rot, give feedback and soar :)
Would you let a random coder come in an attach their laptop to your network and start digging around for a problem in their software? Especially if it's your ass on the line if any regulated data is seen by the wrong pair of eyes?
Or would you just ship them the logs from their own software and tell them to figure it out.
No. But I would a proper Engineer. The same way I don’t go seek treatment in a mall, but rather in a legitimate medical clinic by real MDs.
Does this clarifies things?
> Pretty disappointed with the actual post.
I am as well. What the author describes isn't new or novel, it's been in Windows in the form of ETW since the early 90's. And Windows wasn't the first OS to get it. Had the author taken a serious System/OS class he would have known.
You can't build high performance applications without using some scheme similar to what the author describe.
>Had the author taken a serious System/OS class he would have known.
I'm guessing the author probably did so - this comes across as fairly ascerbic btw.
Typically I only resort to logging in situations where I don't want to propagate an error but I do want to log that an error happened. I also sometimes get lazy and debug using logs. I'm trying to avoid this as much as possible and instead debug by attaching to a process and using breakpoints. However this article doesn't touch on either of these scenarios.
Also, log4j's vulnerability had nothing to do with the actual concept of logging. AFAIK the vulnerability came from log4j's JNDI lookup functionality, which was not doing any kind of input sanitization which allowed attackers to perform remote code execution.
I was really looking forward to a post on logging as a code smell, mostly geared towards inexperienced developers. Pretty disappointed with the actual post.