This appears to be completely separate logic? A balance of interests, in the Canadian case, and an inaliable right, in the U.S. one.
The situations are similar, but the logic used and conclusions reached are quite separate. Understanding the different paths taken exposes it as far from euphemism.
Regardless, "right to work" is more about banning certain union contracts than about providing some "right" to have a job or anything like that.
Edited for precision in response to whimsicalism's reply:
The extent of right to work laws is that union contracts (or I guess any contract) cannot require all employees to pay union fees as part of the union contract. That's it. There's no further restrictions on employers, only this particular restriction on employer-union contracts.
No, they are not.
Employers are prohibited from altering employment contracts ex post facto. But employers are free to make offers conditional on joining a union. Given most employers have wide latitude to alter terms of employment under threat of termination, practically any employer who wants to unionize can trivially do so.
But that is a straw man. In practice, a fraction of employees want to unionize and the employer (with some employees) does not. The argument against unionization is that the first group can't force the second groups into a union contract. The argument for is that they can, provided they represent a majority of the employees.
Here's Alabama's Right to Work amendment, which is broadly representative: https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_Right_to_Work,_Amendment_8_(...
Key passages are
> (c) No person shall be required by an employer to become or remain a member of any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
> (e) An employer may not require a person, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to pay dues, fees, or other charges of any kind to any labor union or labor organization.
The employer is not allowed to make union membership or dues a condition of employment, whether due to a union contract or out of their own volition.
Interestingly, if you want to look at my other post where I discuss noncompetes vs. Right to Work, you'll find that a number of states, when dealing with noncompetes, consider continued employment "sufficient consideration" for the noncompete. This means that in practice, they're allowed to change your employment contract (w.r.t. a noncompete, and presumably other things), and continuing to employ you is enough to make the contract valid, they don't need to offer you anything additional.
Georgia and Florida are two (but there are more) "right to work" states, where the employer is fully within their rights to change your employment contract ex-post-facto, except in regards to union membership.
Right to work laws do not prevent union members from entering a contract with the union to pay it dues because they think it will benefit them. That's how contracts should work. I think you're just trying to play leftist word games to confuse the issue.
In my view, the word games are around the phrase "right to work." Freedom of contract and association is quite unambiguous.
Here's the right to work laws by state: https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-...
Here's a (pdf warning) list of noncompete laws by state: https://faircompetitionlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/No...
Note that only 3 states (California, Oklahoma, and North Dakota) ban non-competes (and I'd quibble with this, California and ND afaik ban noncompetes about poaching customers/clients, while Oklahoma allows you ban employees from poaching client, so CA and ND have the strongest noncompete protection, and one is right to work and one isn't). Of these, North and South Dakota are Right-to-Work, and California is not. It's also hard to draw particular conclusions about trends among (I think the only real one I see is that non-right to work states have salary minimums before you can be subject to a noncompete, but so much of the specifics comes down to how courts have interpreted things). What is pretty clear is that there isn't a strong correlation between right to work laws and noncompete laws.
And further, if you look at the right to work statues (for example Alabama's constitutional amendment: https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_Right_to_Work,_Amendment_8_(..., or Oklahoma's : https://www.findlaw.com/state/oklahoma-law/oklahoma-right-to... as examples), you'll find that they're tailored specifically to prohibit requirements about union dues. They have nothing to do with noncompetes.
So the text of the statutes are unrelated, and its not even clear that there's a general trend of states with right to work laws having more noncompete protection.
I sort of expect you or your lawyer is extrapolating from one state (probably North Dakota, if I had to guess).
Reasonableness is key to enforcement, meaning a reasonable radius, time and field. Any agreement that prevents you from working in your field is defacto-unenforceable specifically because it’s unreasonable.
Both of these attorneys had been practicing in the state for 20 years at the time of the conversation. One graduated from Georgetown and the other from University of South Carolina’s law school.
My understanding from them was that right to work was interpreted as ensuring you actually have “the right to work” via case law with noncompete agreements.
IANAL
>In Canadian labour law, the Rand formula (also referred to as automatic check-off and compulsory checkoff)[1] is a workplace compromise arising from jurisprudence struck between organized labour (trade unions) and employers that guarantees employers industrial stability by requiring all workers affected by a collective agreement to pay dues to the union by mandatory deduction in exchange for the union agreement to "work now, grieve later." Historically, in some workplaces, some workers refused to pay dues to the union even after benefiting from wage and benefit improvements negotiated by the union representatives, resulting in friction and violence as they were seen as 'free-loaders;' at the same time, absence of a peaceful grievance settlement mechanism created industrial instability as union members often walked off the job. The compromise was designed to ensure that no employee will opt out of the union simply to avoid dues yet reap the benefits of collective bargaining, such as higher wages or health insurance.
from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rand_formula