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Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by ajvs on Thursday November 04, 2021 @08:40AM (#29106389)
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @08:47AM (#29106455)
Unfortunately Signal is a walled garden actively fighting against alternative clients and servers. This is enough for me to avoid it and recommend Matrix. If you feel that those issues are critical, please donate your money or time to solve them.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by tptacek on Thursday November 04, 2021 @12:01PM (#29108806)
This isn't responsive to the previous comment. Either the messenger meets or exceeds the privacy and security of Signal or it doesn't. If it doesn't, that's material regardless of what you believe about the aesthetics of Signal or their communitarian spirit. Most people who use secure messengers are LARPing (often in a good-willed performative way, as a way of supporting the privacy of others who truly need it).

But some people aren't LARPing, truly need privacy, and compromising their safety to make a point about federation is immoral.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @12:05PM (#29108866)
Security is not everything there is to want from a messenger. Due to its centralized approach, Signal is having a problem with financing and I doubt it can be easily solved. It had a large downtime recently. Also, it becomes an easy target for all kinds of bad actors, since it's the single server. I trust it less for those reasons, even if it's "secure" by your standards. I just don't see it being secure long-term, not enough to suggest it to my friends or use myself.

People who truly need privacy in the short term, should consult a professional and not trust random comments from strangers.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by tptacek on Thursday November 04, 2021 @12:24PM (#29109136)
I agree that security isn't everything there is to want from a messenger. But when the question being asked is "which messengers are secure", it is the only question that matters.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @12:34PM (#29109250)
No, there is also a question "how long can this messenger stay secure?" In case of Signal, IMHO, the answer is "not very long".
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by tptacek on Thursday November 04, 2021 @02:37PM (#29110923)
None of what you've said to support that argument sounded persuasive to me. I think it's a pretty transparent rhetorical sleight of hand to say "the only way things can actually be secure in the long run is for them to be federated the way I want them to be". I get it, you want to run federated systems that you can build your own clients for. The evidence for those kinds of systems being the most private runs strongly in the opposite direction.

Would you like an example that's especially relevant to this thread? Because I can provide you with one.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @02:47PM (#29111029)
> "the only way things can actually be secure in the long run is for them to be federated the way I want them to be"

I never mentioned any particular kind of federation that I prefer. I also never mentioned word "private", which is mostly tangential to federation.

My point is that, in the long run, only federated systems are sustainable, because nobody is able to fund huge servers with millions of users without infinite money. For example, Signal and Telegram are both struggling with that currently; the latter introduced advertisement recently. On the other hand, Mastodon does not seem to have such problem (you could argue that it's too early though).

I do not want to build my own clients, I'm not even a programmer. I want a sustainable network, which could be achieved by a large number of self-hosted instances federated with (possibly) large servers. It has been working fine with email for decades. Also, the competition of various independent clients improves the user experience (like any other healthy competition elsewhere).

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by tptacek on Thursday November 04, 2021 @06:04PM (#29113059)
Yeah. How'd that work out for Matrix? Here's a hint: find out when the project was started, and when the network first required end-to-end encryption. Warning: the answer to that entirely vindicates Signal's position on federation; you may not like it.

That doesn't make Matrix bad. It makes Matrix different. Matrix has different goals than Signal, and those goals simply prioritize security and privacy differently than Signal does.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by Arathorn on Thursday November 04, 2021 @06:23PM (#29113208)
I'll bite: we first created Matrix in 2014; we started implementing E2EE in 2016 and we turned it on by default in 2020. The reason it took so long was because we focused first on getting decentralisation (not federation) correct, and then the protocol started to get prematurely successful and we got sucked into ensuring the implementations (and spec) scaled and the governance was correct... even before E2EE was stable enough to be on by default.

You're completely right that we have different goals to Signal (openness + freedom rather than privacy-at-all-costs), but I'm not sure that blaming federation is the right answer here. We just prioritised building an open standard over having E2EE from day 1, instead choosing to design things so we could add it later.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by tptacek on Thursday November 04, 2021 @07:13PM (#29113594)
As I recall, you had false starts getting E2E enabled by default (6 years after the project started)... because popular client software didn't have it working. That's not a problem Signal has or ever will have: when they want to roll out new privacy features (like they just did days ago!), they roll the clients.

Again: I'm not dunking on Matrix. There are things the Matrix approach will do better than Signal can. But protecting individuals is probably never going to be one of them; you're competing with a project that has security and privacy as its overriding goal, and nobody at Signal ever has to ask whether federation --- a protocol complexifier if ever there was one --- merits a security hit.

I don't use Signal for everything (or even most things). I'm completely open to the argument that other messengers are better "overall" than Signal. But on a thread that asks the question of whether Matrix is as secure as Signal (not "secure enough", but rather "at parity with"), there is simply a clear answer.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by Arathorn on Friday November 05, 2021 @04:18AM (#29116663)
I don’t think we had any false starts on e2ee by default? We wrote pantalaimon as a local shim to let any unencrypted matrix client do e2ee, and then (eventually) flipped the switch. The thing that stopped us doing so earlier is that we wanted to have optional online keybackup and cross signing and better key verification UX before we forced everyone into it.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by haffenloher on Friday November 05, 2021 @09:13AM (#29118715)
> nobody is able to fund huge servers with millions of users without infinite money. For example, Signal and Telegram are both struggling with that currently

I'm willing to believe that this is true for Telegram, since they do pretty much everything on the server. With Signal, though, message databases and most business logic are client-side, so the servers are surprisingly dumb and lean. Signal spends way more on salaries and wages than on its servers. In 2019, Signal paid more to Twilio for SMS verification than it did to AWS for hosting: https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/824...

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by growse on Thursday November 04, 2021 @03:48PM (#29111719)
Dismissing a platform that's solving real problems for real people right now because it might not exist in 5 years is a pretty weird thing to do.

"Sustainability" is arbitrary. Everything burns eventually.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Friday November 05, 2021 @04:27AM (#29116714)
The problem is that such security is unstable due to unstable funding and the single target. You never know when it stops being secure (without a warning) or even available.

I am mostly talking about a use case, where you try to switch all your friends and relatives to a new IM system. If you have to ask them to switch again in a couple of years, you will loose their trust quickly.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by tptacek on Friday November 05, 2021 @11:15AM (#29120437)
You keep alluding to the "instability" of Signal's security, but your argument for that is a non sequitur. Repeating it doesn't make it more compelling.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by m-p-3 on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:16AM (#29106777)
And Signal forces you to use your phone number as your identifier, which can be traced relatively easily to a person or at least a geographical position by the authorities.

The content of the message might be encrypted, but metadata can provide valuable intelligence insights.

At least Matrix can be used mostly anonymously through a user-generated identifier, without an email address or phone number, and can be used through Tor.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by shapefrog on Thursday November 04, 2021 @12:22PM (#29109096)
> And Signal forces you to use your phone number as your identifier

Signal forces you to use "a" phone number as your identifier. It does not have to be your primary phone number, or home phone number or office phone number. Just a phone number that you have control of.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @02:27PM (#29110795)
> Just a phone number that you have control of.

In most parts of the world, you cannot get "just" a phone number not tied to your real identity.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by snark42 on Thursday November 04, 2021 @03:20PM (#29111415)
Prepaid cellular phones and Google Voice aren't available in most parts of the world with a little effort?
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @03:47PM (#29111703)
I was speaking about the prepaid cellular phones. Again, in most parts of the world, you cannot get an anonymous sim-card. AFAIK you also cannot create a Google account without a phone number.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by shapefrog on Friday November 05, 2021 @06:20AM (#29117353)
Everyone loves to say depends on your threat model so lets define "tied to your real identity".

1. the number everyone you have met since you were 12 has in their contacts.

2. the number a few people have but you also use for you facebook account.

3. the number nobody / no tech has but you have provided your legal id to the network provider.

4. the number nobody / no tech has and you gave the network provider a burner email for.

5. the number nobody / no tech has that you paid for in cash while wearing a wig and glasses half way across town. You put into a new, paid for in cash phone, activated and used briefly while carrying no other electronic devices while disguised and avoiding cctv.

6. the inbound phone number in the lobby of the ritz carlton.

Some of those are better than using 'firstname.lastname' as you identifier. 1&2 are definately public numbers 4&5&6 are not.

#3 in the real world is semi-anonymous - for those with real privacy needs, they should be taking many other precautions and shouldnt be carrying a tracking device or using a single phone number or service irrespective of it being in their name or someone elses or nobody at all. For privacy LARPERS of course it is not at all anonymous.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by spurgu on Thursday November 04, 2021 @10:53AM (#29107944)
> The content of the message might be encrypted, but metadata can provide valuable intelligence insights.

What metadata? Signal doesn't store anything about you aside the date you joined and the time of your last ping.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by bigyellow on Thursday November 04, 2021 @11:25AM (#29108372)
> Signal doesn't store anything about you aside the date you joined and the time of your last ping.

Last I checked, Signal uses AWS, Azure and GCP. All of those services are completely logged and although "Signal" may not be storing metadata, intelligence services on those networks definitely are.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by uoaei on Thursday November 04, 2021 @11:23AM (#29108350)
Data is sent over a network, and has an origin and destination. Of course Signal wouldn't store things like that, but the network administrator wouldn't have much trouble collecting extra metadata such as that on top of what is stored.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by BeatLeJuce on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:43AM (#29107071)
I recently changed my mind on this: being able to use phone numbers as identifiers also has some benefits: Last time I was on vacation, it was easy to get in touch with service providers (e.g. surf school, massage place) via WhatsApp, simply because I had their number, and everyone used WhatsApp anyways. If Signal would be more popular, I could instead contact them directly via Signal, since I only need their phone number. It allows for a more seamless transition.

Matrix OTOH would have a harder time getting adopted: businesses would need to update their websites, facebook pages and flyers to add the matrix contact info. Which they wouldn't do until Matrix is more popular. Which is a chicken and egg problem.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by bilkow on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:58AM (#29107251)
Although optional, matrix actually has identity servers, which allow people to find you via phone number / email.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by 3np on Thursday November 04, 2021 @10:01AM (#29107281)
Matrix still has 3pids, including phone number and email.

The most common client, Element, will by default ask you for your phone number when registering with the default matrix.org homeserver and the default vector.im identity server will associate your phone number with your matrix user.

So by default (changing servers and/or opting out is easy and encouraged BTW), Matrix already works like you would prefer.

This is BTW a main critique in the OP since it makes vector.im a PII and metadata aggregator.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by hansel_der on Thursday November 04, 2021 @10:37AM (#29107744)
> being able to use phone numbers as identifiers also has some benefits

of course it has, but so has the ability to NOT use a phone number. different use cases

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by EGreg on Thursday November 04, 2021 @08:54AM (#29106527)
In terms of closed centralized services, I’d say Telegram is my top pick, followed by Signal. But I would take open source decentralized networks over them anyday, and my favorite is Freenet, or the much newer network, MaidSAFE because it is the most secure thing I have ever seen (but that’s not mainstream yet).
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by XorNot on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:39AM (#29107021)
Telegram is not encrypted E2E by default at all.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by EGreg on Thursday November 04, 2021 @01:23PM (#29109991)
I don’t need it encrypted BY DEFAULT. If I want to encrypt something, I can. It also means the chats aren’t available on other devices and you lose other capabilities
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @02:30PM (#29110832)
> It also means the chats aren’t available on other devices

Not, it doesn't. You would just need to copy the private key to the other devices.

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by EGreg on Thursday November 04, 2021 @07:06PM (#29113536)
How to do it?
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Friday November 05, 2021 @05:16AM (#29116990)
This is currently only a hypothetical possibility AFAIK.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by this_user on Thursday November 04, 2021 @11:05AM (#29108103)
And the encryption they are offering is custom, which is always at least suspect.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by EGreg on Thursday November 04, 2021 @01:24PM (#29109997)
I actually trust it more to not have backdoors. Signal is written by the same guys who sold to Facebook, and although both Moxie and Pavel are anarchists, I trust the guys who were actually ousted from their own country and yes, rolled their own encryption (with bounties to break it) rather than use an officially approved one

https://twitter.com/durov/status/872891017418113024?lang=en

https://telegra.ph/Why-Using-WhatsApp-Is-Dangerous-01-30-4

Besides - Moxie is kind of against decentralization, he thinks that by centralizing trust in a certain entity, things can be better. I am not convinced that such an approach leads to a better model for me to have encrypted communications:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21904469

I like that Signal started using SGX though. It’s not ideal (now I have to trust Intel instead) but at least if you’re going to be running some code on a centralized service instead of byzantine consensus, let me know you aren’t backdooring it:

https://medium.com/@maniacbolts/signal-increases-their-relia...

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by kown7 on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:22AM (#29106834)
I don't see the allure of Telegram over anything; can you elaborate?
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by EGreg on Thursday November 04, 2021 @01:22PM (#29109981)
More user friendly

Crypto that I trust more than Signal

Far more documented and open (even though backend is not)

Supports many clients

Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by hansel_der on Thursday November 04, 2021 @10:39AM (#29107767)
it works very well on every device/os and can easily be extended
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @08:56AM (#29106546)
How about Ricochet instant messenger or I2P?
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by Snitch-Thursday on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:11AM (#29106721)
Think Ricochet got replaced by cwtch.im correct? At least the binaries I can find of Ricochet are super stale.
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by fsflover on Thursday November 04, 2021 @09:32AM (#29106943)
Re:Notes on privacy and data collection of Matrix.org (2019) by foxfluff on Thursday November 04, 2021 @11:14AM (#29108216)
I think this one is also pretty bad. And years later still not fixed. https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/2527

In short? When you look at a room, your client sends a (public) read receipt. So stalkers get near-realtime data on your activity and the simple act of viewing different rooms (and maybe even just focusing the window) to see what's up causes data to be sent to the server. Ugh.