If you wanted to store photos in icloud on a Windows machine, you'd be using the Apple icloud client. Apple has at least some control over what software they write and ship does[1]. They can break 3rd party clients almost at will, so if they choose to be hostile to 3rd party clients that control is fairly strong.
Arguing over what amount of control Apple should exercise over what software runs on a device purchased by a consumer is mostly orthogonal to arguing over what amount of control Apple should exercise over what software can connect to their servers.
1: On a general purpose machine, debuggers and emulators can influence what software does, obviously, so the control isn't absolute.
Maybe it would be nice to have a tool that would allow you to see exactly what data the client side scanner is “allowed” to “see”?
The argument over whose computer it is applies pretty similarly. My computer is not part of their infrastructure, and they should only be controlling the software on their infrastructure.
It means precisely that Apple has no technical capability to remotely access the device.
It means any (consented) Apple software update leaves behind no hooks or backdoors that enable subsequent, remotely-initiated access.
It means there verifiably exist no code paths that allow remote exfiltration of data, other than those that pass through consent dialogs. The basic distinction between legitimate OS functionality, and malware.
It's not as if Apple's marketing doesn't heavily emphasize the "private", "E2E encrypted" aspects already.
So somebody else has to do housekeeping and hand-holding. That's where apple comes in again, or better, stays for convenience sake.
And to not complicate their own day, Apple just does it the same for all.
Stallman was very, very right.