Seems as though French engineering has been sufficient for nearly half a century now.

On the contrary, our major nuclear R&D company messed up an extension of the Flamanville nuclear plant multiple times: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flamanville_Nuclear_Power_Plan...

Also see Olkiluoto 3 in Finland: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olkiluoto_Nuclear_Power_Plant#...

"The main contractor, Areva, is building the unit for a fixed price of €3 billion, so in principle, any construction costs above that price fall on Areva. In July 2012, those overruns were estimated at more than €2 billion, and in December 2012, Areva estimated that the full cost of building the reactor would be about €8.5 billion, well over the previous estimate of €6.4 billion."

"Safe nuclear power needs German engineering"

France and Germany jointly developed the European Pressurised Reactor (EBR). In France, development was led by Framatome and EDF, and in Germany by Siemens.

There are currently 3 nuclear plants under construction (or almost ready for operation) using EBR in Europe - they are in France, Finland and the UK.

Unfortunately, all three plants are over-budget and over-schedule.

The UK plant (Hinkley Point C) is expected to provide 7% of the UK's electricity when it is operational in 2026. It is designed to run for at least 60 years. (Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-somerset-58724732)

France has just made an offer to build 4-6 such reactors in Poland. I really hope our government takes the deal, cause we need nuclear power. Even if it also ends up over-budget and over-schedule that's still good thing to have such modern reactors.

Like low emissions diesel engines did?

The motors were capable of hitting the spec as it did during testing, after flipping a few bits in the software the car just has a few PS fewer.

What’s not safe about the nuclear engineering in the UK or France?

UK: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sellafield#Radiological_releas... Between 1950 and 2000, there were 21 serious incidents or accidents involving off-site radiological releases that warranted a rating on the International Nuclear Event Scale, one at level 5, five at level 4 and fifteen at level 3. Additionally, during the 1950s and 1960s there were protracted periods of known, deliberate discharges to the atmosphere of plutonium and irradiated uranium oxide particulates. These frequent incidents, together with the large 2005 THORP plant leak which was not detected for nine months, have led some to doubt the effectiveness of the managerial processes and safety culture on the site over the years.

https://ehss.energy.gov/SESA/Files/corporatesafety/safety_bu... On April 20, 2005, a camera inspection of a feed clarification cell at THORP revealed that 83,000 liters of dissolver solution had leaked from a broken pipe (Figure 1) into the cell sump. The highly radioactive dissolver solution, consisting of approximately 19 metric tons of uranium, plutonium and fission products dissolved in nitric acid, was entirely contained within the stainless steel-lined cell. No personnel were injured as a result of this incident. However, the cleanup costs for this event are expected to exceed $500 million, and the THORP facility faces a lengthy shutdown (possibly even permanent closure).

France: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-reprocessing-t... Reprocessing also results in radioactive liquid waste: the French reprocessing plant in La Hague discharges 100 million liters of liquid waste (pdf) into the English Channel each year. "They have polluted the ocean all the way to the Arctic," Makhijani says. "Eleven western European countries have asked them to stop reprocessing."

Germany: https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/meetings/2018/marc... Since 1991* increasing inflow of brine from the Southern flank Since 1994* reports on contaminated brines (3H, 137Cs)