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Re:YubiKey Bio Series by eykanal on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @05:54PM (#28766174)
Its pretty well known that fingerprints _by themselves_ are a pretty poor replacement for passwords. (a) They're public, in that it's pretty easy to get someone's fingerprint... just find something they touched recently. (b) If they're compromised its impossible to change them.

I don't think this gets around either of those points, but I am curious if this somehow makes it much more difficult to either compromise the fingerprint hash (fingerprint fingerprint?) or makes the resultant hash less useful once compromised.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by g_p on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:04PM (#28766279)
In essence, you require both the Yubikey in question, and the information supplied by the fingerprint reader to the Yubikey, in order to abuse this system.

From the perspective of a U2F token, which uses a regular button, this is an increase in security for most users -- if their token is lost or stolen, or left in their device, someone cannot use their token by tapping the button.

This doesn't address the inherent problem of irrevocability/unchangeability of biometrics, but it presents an interesting usability trade-off that could help non-technical users to keep their systems more secure.

If you capture the wire signal between the fingerprint reader sensor and the module, it is likely that you could replay a valid authentication. If not, you could delve deeper into the sensor until eventually you are able to inject capacitive data from the sensing surface itself, and do this.

In this case, by combining the use of a biometric with strong cryptographic authentication through the token, you require both to compromise the user -- no biometrics are shared with a server, it's all local. However if you lose either the token, or the ability to use that fingerprint (i.e. scratch or damage), you will lose access to the key the Yubikey has protected, absent some kind of backup password. For many users, that backup password will be the weak link, but a Yubikey should at least be able to rate limit attempts and erase its internal state if there are too many attempts.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by tialaramex on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:28PM (#28766536)
For the WebAuthn scenario there is no inherent backup, there's deliberately no way to export the keys. For a random web site, they're likely going to offer some way back in - albeit Google is content to make that quite hard if you choose their "Advanced Protection" scheme (and I think one of the free Git offerings just says too bad, you gave us no money, you're locked out but you lost nothing of value), but an employer might very reasonably issue employees a Security Key and say something like, look, if you lose it that sucks but go to Front Desk with your Line Manager, and they can issue you a new one, there is no bypass.

As a user, it also makes sense (particularly if you know you're a real target, e.g. a political journalist, politician, activist) to just own more than one.

> Yubikey should at least be able to rate limit attempts and erase its internal state if there are too many attempts.

On the previous generation with a PIN as second factor, if you guess the PIN wrong repeatedly it locks you out.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by psanford on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @07:46PM (#28767241)
Ideally, I'd have 2 webauthn tokens, one that I keep on myself, and one that I have at a secure, off site location (like a safe deposit box, if you consider that secure). The problem is you need to physically posses the backup key to register it to any new services you might sign up for.

Yubikey has proposed a webauthn extension to support this usecase[0]. Unfortunately it requires both changes to both hardware and server side webauthn libraries, so it will likely be years before this would actually be a viable solution.

[0]: https://www.yubico.com/blog/yubico-proposes-webauthn-protoco...

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by g_p on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:33PM (#28766581)
Indeed - the lack of backups in WebAuthn is a design feature (although I can see credible usability issues in online services where users should really enrol several, but struggle to keep them in different locations and ensure they register their off-site backup key to each service etc.)

I presume (but haven't reviewed in detail) that these bio keys will have a backup PIN in the same way previous models had the PIN available for management and WebAuthn modes of operation - there are some real-world failure modes where wet hands or a bandaged finger may be an issue, but the user still wants to keep using it. I do agree the best solution is to get several tokens, enrol them all for each service, and just keep them as safe as you realistically can.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by staticassertion on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:33PM (#28766586)
The backup would be another hardware token, ideally. Just one that isn't biometric. You would guard physical access to that token more closely.

Google's Advanced Protection Program enforces two keys, since they also make recovery much stricter.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by staticassertion on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:33PM (#28766574)
Without this model the attacker needs to steal the Yubikey. With this model the attacker needs to steal the Yubikey and pull a fingerprint.

It remains to be seen if that's a meaningful difference, but it seems reasonable that in some situations it could make the attack much more costly.

I could see myself using this when traveling.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by wnevets on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:08PM (#28766325)
> Its pretty well known that fingerprints _by themselves_ are a pretty poor replacement for passwords. (a) They're public, in that it's pretty easy to get someone's fingerprint... just find something they touched recently. (b) If they're compromised its impossible to change them.

I'm a bit more worried about Russian ransomware operators getting my passwords than my fingerprint.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by robbedpeter on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @07:16PM (#28766958)
Hope you never have a picture posted online with your fingers in view, then.

Biometrics are terrible security tokens.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by tinus_hn on Wednesday October 06, 2021 @03:37AM (#28770256)
Similarly you could say iPhones with Touch ID are terrible because phones are full of fingerprints. Yet it turns out people who want to crack them attack the pincodes or the general security of the device, not the fingerprints.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by tmottabr on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @07:27PM (#28767058)
they might, but likely not with a resolution good enough to allow then to actually extract an useful fingerprint.. specially not after social media resize and convert the image a thousand times.

also, fingerprint is not the only security, you still need physical access to the yubikey to use it, something a russian hacker also will have a hard time having..

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by wnevets on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @10:22PM (#28768452)
how does a Russian hacker having a picture of my fingerprint allow them to use my Yubikey to unlock my account?
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by bsza on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @07:04PM (#28766859)
If the police/border protection/etc ever took your fingerprints, don't worry, they'll get to them too. Maybe with even less effort than would be required for your password, depending on how diligently you protect your passwords.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by executive on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:12PM (#28766373)
even if they chop off your hand?
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by wnevets on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:16PM (#28766423)
If Russian ransomware operators want to even attempt to chop off my hand I would need to start making much more interesting life choices that I have been.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by staticassertion on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:35PM (#28766601)
Time to add an embedded EKG as another factor :)
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by 2OEH8eoCRo0 on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:23PM (#28766492)
It's not only a fingerprint. The fingerprint tells the yubikey that it's you who is activating it.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by pfundstein on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:40PM (#28766652)
A fingerprint is not a password, it's a username.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by jolmg on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:17PM (#28766433)
I haven't used any of the other modes on my Yubikey 4 than the OpenPGP Smartcard. I would hope that other modes also support PINs/passwords, so the fingerprint is just an additional factor. If that's the case, it's not necessarily about replacing passwords with fingerprints.
Re:YubiKey Bio Series by jiveturkey on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @08:40PM (#28767695)
> fingerprints _by themselves_ are a pretty poor replacement for passwords

eh, that is not well known nor is it true. It is very much use case dependent.

For example, a fingerprint is a great replacement for a password to unlock your phone, for most uses of such.