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Re:YubiKey Bio Series by tialaramex on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:28PM (#28766536)
For the WebAuthn scenario there is no inherent backup, there's deliberately no way to export the keys. For a random web site, they're likely going to offer some way back in - albeit Google is content to make that quite hard if you choose their "Advanced Protection" scheme (and I think one of the free Git offerings just says too bad, you gave us no money, you're locked out but you lost nothing of value), but an employer might very reasonably issue employees a Security Key and say something like, look, if you lose it that sucks but go to Front Desk with your Line Manager, and they can issue you a new one, there is no bypass.

As a user, it also makes sense (particularly if you know you're a real target, e.g. a political journalist, politician, activist) to just own more than one.

> Yubikey should at least be able to rate limit attempts and erase its internal state if there are too many attempts.

On the previous generation with a PIN as second factor, if you guess the PIN wrong repeatedly it locks you out.

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by psanford on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @07:46PM (#28767241)
Ideally, I'd have 2 webauthn tokens, one that I keep on myself, and one that I have at a secure, off site location (like a safe deposit box, if you consider that secure). The problem is you need to physically posses the backup key to register it to any new services you might sign up for.

Yubikey has proposed a webauthn extension to support this usecase[0]. Unfortunately it requires both changes to both hardware and server side webauthn libraries, so it will likely be years before this would actually be a viable solution.

[0]: https://www.yubico.com/blog/yubico-proposes-webauthn-protoco...

Re:YubiKey Bio Series by g_p on Tuesday October 05, 2021 @06:33PM (#28766581)
Indeed - the lack of backups in WebAuthn is a design feature (although I can see credible usability issues in online services where users should really enrol several, but struggle to keep them in different locations and ensure they register their off-site backup key to each service etc.)

I presume (but haven't reviewed in detail) that these bio keys will have a backup PIN in the same way previous models had the PIN available for management and WebAuthn modes of operation - there are some real-world failure modes where wet hands or a bandaged finger may be an issue, but the user still wants to keep using it. I do agree the best solution is to get several tokens, enrol them all for each service, and just keep them as safe as you realistically can.