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A comment on Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux. Parent comment

Re:Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by teddyh on Thursday September 23, 2021 @10:56AM (#28630082)
> LUKS leaves encryption metadata unencrypted.

Except for ruling out plausible deniability, what problem does this pose?

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Re:Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by SV_BubbleTime on Thursday September 23, 2021 @01:24PM (#28632265)
Which is kinda funny on a laptop. If some authority told you to unlock a device and it did have a plausible deniability encryption system - no one is going to believe that anyway.

For a USB drive or a file, sure, feature. For a laptop, “duh, it’s encrypted” is going to be the first thing anyone considers. Not “well, I guess the laptop has no data on it at all!”

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Re:Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by r-w on Thursday September 23, 2021 @04:18PM (#28634706)
Hence, “plausible”.
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Re:Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by adgjlsfhk1 on Thursday September 23, 2021 @01:19PM (#28632177)
Metadata includes file names. If you have a file on your computer called proof_nsa_is_doing_illegal_stuff.pdf, that would significantly help a prosecutor trying to convict a wistleblower even if they can't get the file.
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Re:Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by Unklejoe on Thursday September 23, 2021 @02:14PM (#28632916)
No it doesn't. LUKS encrypts a block device, and then the filesystem is instantiated on that encrypted block device. No file names are visible.
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Re:Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by teddyh on Thursday September 23, 2021 @04:39PM (#28635028)
No, the LUKS header includes only encryption metadata, not file system metadata.
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