I'm not smart enough to really think it through but at a glance it seems to resolve those various tests and scenarios. In the malfunctioning teleport example (where the cell destroyer fails to fire), _both_ London Tim and Boston Tim are equally alive because they share the past: the teleport has succeeded in bifurcating their consciousness. Same with the split-brain twins (though you'd expect the results to be diminished).
These thought experiments got me thinking about how a conscious entity might better be considered as its "world line", not just its instantaneous physical embodiment. Call that a soul if you want, but there's no particular reason to.
But we effectively always get back the the ship of Theseus, and circling back to Trek,
Does Data have a soul? I don't know that he has. I don't know that I have. But I have got to give him the freedom to explore that question himself.
And which one do you think we should kill off once the away mission is done? Should we be as sanguine about it as Captain Janeway was about murdering Tuvix?
Does that new copy become "you" if you simply incinerate the original?
If we clone A, then from A's perspective we now have A-Prime. A-Prime is unaware and believes they are A, who now presumably has been killed. If anyone didn't observe this happen, then A-Prime essentially -is- A. If they did observe it, then they know that it's technically A-Prime.
So I guess the difference is being able to observe the gradual changes. It's more tricky when discussing an inanimate object like a ship that doesn't care either way.
Btw, we talk about replica's but that's only because we assume the process leaves an original and a copy, but that's not necessarily so, for example a photon of high energy can split into 2 photons of lower energy. We are not talking about originals and replica's there. One can imagine that our duplication process follows similar rules.
When copying or simply making 2 out of 1, for computers, both still have computer-0 in /etc/hostname so there's that... It's just that neither of the computers will complain when we change their designation at random.
This leaves me feeling weird about the destruction of an original in any copying process. The destruction during copying feels ok, but doing it afterwards feels very bad. It's like we want consciousness to be continuous in time. But why? Again, Permutation City goes into this in a nice way...
How about heart? What if you removed part of your brain.
What if you grew a replacement part instead of reattaching? When does Theseus become a new person?
Alternatively can you prove you were alive yesterday? Or do you just have the memories, and others have memories of an indistinguishable copy?
How much of your body existed 20 years ago? Are you the same person?